


CONTENTS

TAB A	Closing Remarks to Project <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 80px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span> at 4:15 on 10 February 1965	STAT
TAB B	Address to Midcareer Course on 19 February 1965	
TAB C	Address to Defense Intelligence School on 9 March 1965	
TAB D	Speech at West Point Founders' Day Dinner on 12 March 1965	
TAB E	Address at the Army War College on 30 March 1965	

DIA review(s) completed.





US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

8 April 1965

Dear General Carter:

Thank you for your note of 2 April. I too feel our act is improving. The closer coordination this year also contributed to the enjoyment of working with you. Due to your brilliance and composure both the skit and your lecture were tremendously successful at the College.

I agree with you, however, that next year we must collaborate the script without Colonel Gallagher. Since I cannot enter your kingdom for this venture, will you meet me at the Marriott? You see, you did get your signals straight.

Very truly yours,

*Shirley*  
SHIRLEY SHEARER

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D.C.

P.S. Can you spare a picture with three stars?



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

7 April

Dear General Carter,

I am most grateful for your nice letter which I received the other day. I don't really mind being a training aid as it's all in the game.

I'd like to say that I really got a great deal out of your talk - as did the class - and we appreciate your utter frankness and confidence. It was a fine morning.

STAT

Please give my best regards to [redacted]

STAT

[redacted] who, I understand had a slight coronary the other day. I used to work both for and with him in Saigon. Needless to say, we had some interesting but frustrating times.



I've been keeping in touch with John  
and understand that he plans to settle in  
D.C. on retirement in 1966. I think he'll  
move into that [redacted] house<sup>STAT</sup>  
which he and [redacted] bought in 1950<sup>STAT</sup>

Again, thank you and Good Luck.

Count on me as a supporter of patiens and a  
resolute Admin in the current unpleasantness. I've  
written an entire thesis on this subject. We  
can take them at their game if we don't get  
sold out.

Very Respectfully,

GS [Signature]



**US ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.

6 April 1965

Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter  
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Carter,

In the words of the song, "We did have fun....".

Thank you for your nice letter. I delivered Shirley's to her and she was tickled pink.

You should be getting some literature soon from the Pennsylvania Fish Commission. I hope that it proves sufficiently attractive to lure you up this way. I am a long way from the best fisherman in the World, but with the incentive of your participation I could get off my posterior and get with the arrangements. I believe that an annual non resident license is nine dollars or maybe half a dollar more. That's not bad considering that a resident license is five. For hunting I believe it is twenty five. A three day fishing license is available at five.

Col Chick Haley was the Post 's champion fisherman. He could give you the rundown as he sees it. He is in Army Personnel in the Pentagon; however, my directory is too old to have him listed. His first name is James W.

Give my best to [redacted] Instant Expert.

STAT

Sincerely yours,

Wilford E. Itz

2 April 1965

Colonel M. F. Itz, USAF  
U. S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear Colonel Itz:

Just a note to thank you more formally for the fine assistance you gave [ ] and me as our Escort Officer on our recent visit to the War College.

STAT

Everything went like clockwork and we could not have been taken better care of. I hope you will let us come back -- especially when there is some hunting and fishing.

With my thanks again,

Faithfully yours,

/s/

[ ]  
Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

25X1

P. S. Would appreciate your delivering the attached.

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

2 April 1965

Dear Shirley:

Just a note to thank you again for appearing on the stage with me -- I think the show we put on is getting better and better, but if they would let us write the scenario, we could probably improve on it a lot.

Thanks again also for not upstaging me too badly -- keep your guard up!!

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee (enclosed in letter to Colonel Itz)  
1 - DDCI

2 April 1965

Major General Eugene A. Salet  
Commandant  
Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear Gene:

Just a note to thank you more formally for taking such fine care of [ ] and me, for letting us harass your troops, and for the fine dinner at your quarters and luncheon at the Club.

We enjoyed every minute of it and, as you know, it is always a refreshing experience to get out of this vale of tears here in Washington and see what the troops in the field are doing -- especially when they are younger officers in an academic atmosphere!

Hope you'll let us come back sometime -- and I do hope you will understand my inability to join you at the Seminar in June.

With my thanks again,

Faithfully yours,

*1s/Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

~~1 - ER via ExDir~~

Note: [ ] also enclosed a hand-written note as follows:  
"Dear General Salet:

Just a tail-piece to add my personal thanks to you, your staff, and the students for your hospitality and many courtesies.

Best wishes,

2 April 1965

Lt. Colonel George Patton  
U. S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear George:

Just a note to thank you again and more formally  
for being the finest living training aid I have ever had!!  
I was able to lean on you several times to bail me out of  
some of the blank spots in my presentation!!

Seriously, I heard most complimentary remarks  
about you from a number of instructors, including the  
Commandant -- you have every reason to take great pride  
in your career to date and to be assured that you are living  
up to the fine start that your mother and dad gave you.

Many thanks again for your assistance.

Faithfully yours,

*/s/ MSC*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

~~1 - ER~~



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

1 April 1965

C

Dear General Carter:

On behalf of the entire US Army War College may I express our deep appreciation for your outstanding presentation to the Class on 30 March 1965.

Your authoritative and analytical observations on "The Long Range Threat" provided a clear and most requisite background for our curriculum. We especially appreciated your candor and skill, and your fine sense of humor. These qualities all contributed to this superior presentation. I am sure that both the content of your address and your excellence as a speaker will be long remembered by all of us.

We are, indeed, grateful to you for your generous and splendid contribution to our curriculum, and for your continued support of the War College.

Sincerely,



EUGENE A. SALET

Major General, United States Army  
Commandant

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter**



0830

Friday, 2 Apr

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



# WEEKLY SCHEDULE

NO. 31

29 MAR - 2 APR 65

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND FUTURE

MILITARY POWER

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Monday, 29 Mar

Time

0830 - 1030 *Europe Presentation*  
Root Hall Auditorium  
1330 - 1530 *Middle East-South Asia*  
*Presentation* Root Hall Auditorium  
1600 Course 6 Summary  
Col V. G. Conley  
1630 Course 7 Orientation Col J. H. King  
Lt Col L. D. Holder

Tuesday, 30 Mar

0830 *The Long Range Threat* L7-02  
Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5  
Lt Gen M. S. Carter  
Deputy Dir, CIA

1030

ALC, Room 201, Bliss Hall, 2 per com

Orientation

Bliss Hall Com Rooms

Wednesday, 31 Mar

0830 *Industry's Challenge to the* L7-03  
*Military* Dr. T. O. Paine  
Mgr, G. E. TEMPO  
1030 ALC, Room 201, Bliss Hall, 2 per com

Thursday, 1 Apr

0810 Op Gp Briefing  
0830 *Future Weapons Systems of* L7-04  
*the Army* Lt Gen W. W. Dick  
CRD  
1030 ALC, Room 201, Bliss Hall, 2 per com

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



DP80B01676R001500020001-5

Major General Eugene A. Saleh

*requests the pleasure of the company of*

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter

*at a stay dinner*

*on Monday twenty-nine March*

*at Six-thirty o'clock*

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

To remind

*Beate me  
Informal*

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

## **US ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

### **YOUR BILLETS**

The billeting charge for guests occupying accommodations in the Washington Hall Guest House is:

\$2.00 per day, one person in room

\$1.50 per person, per night (2 or more in room or suite)


It would be appreciated if prior to your departure from this station you would reimburse the desk clerk at the Guest House or the US Army War College Officer who has been designated as your aide.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter**




---

**US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS  
PENNSYLVANIA**

---

**1964-65**

**GUIDE  
FOR  
GUESTS**



It is a pleasure to welcome you to Carlisle Barracks, the home of the US Army's senior educational institution, the US Army War College, and the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies.

Whether you come as a guest, a member of the faculty, Institute of Advanced Studies, the Post, or the student body, we are pleased to welcome you to our historic Post. We trust that your time here will be rewarding and enjoyable.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Eugene A. Salet". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "E" and "S".

EUGENE A. SALET  
Major General, United States Army  
Commandant

	Page
A Brief History of Carlisle Barracks	1
A Brief History of the US Army War College	2
Students	3
Mission of the College	3
General Plan of the Curriculum	4
Methods of Instruction	16
Lectures	18
Location	19
Accommodations	20
Daylight Saving Time	20
Travel	20
US Army War College Auditorium	21-23



The first regular military garrison at Carlisle was established on 30 May 1757, upon the arrival of one battalion of the British Royal American Regiment and two thousand Provincial troops from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland under the command of Colonel John Stanwix.

In 1758 General John Forbes marched from Carlisle to take Fort Duquesne from the French. Six years later, Pontiac's War ended in victory for the forces of Colonel Henri Bouquet which had trained and based at the area which has become Carlisle Barracks.

Early in the Revolutionary War in recognition of the Army's great requirement for munitions, General Washington directed the establishment of an ordnance powder factory on the site of the Old British Camp. The availability of many skilled armorers in the area around Carlisle, together with iron and coal within easy reach, made Carlisle Barracks, or Washingtonburg as it was called during the Revolutionary War period, an ideal location for an arsenal. Many prisoners taken by the Continental Army were sent to Washingtonburg where they were put to work. Among this group were Hessians, captured at the Battle of Trenton, who helped to build a powder magazine. This magazine, completed in 1777, still stands and is known today as the Hessian Guard House Museum.

It is fitting that today Carlisle Barracks should be the home of the Army's senior school, for it was also the site of what is believed to be the Army's first school - one for training Artillerists, established by Captain Isaac Coren in 1777.

It was not until 1801 that the Old Post actually became Federal property when it was purchased from the heirs of William Penn.

From 1838 until 1879, except for brief periods during the Civil War, Carlisle Barracks was successively the United States Army's first Cavalry School of Practice, and a Cavalry Depot, supplying superbly trained troopers to most of our famous cavalry units which saw action in the Mexican and Civil Wars and in Indian skirmishes in the West.

In the early morning hours of 2 July 1863, the Confederate General Fitzhugh Lee, operating as

one of General JEB Stuart's Division Commanders, burned Carlisle Barracks to the ground after shelling Carlisle with some 134 rounds of artillery. Lee then withdrew toward Gettysburg.

Carlisle Barracks rose from its ashes quickly, however, and resumed its role as a Cavalry Depot until November 1879 when it was transferred on loan to the Department of the Interior for use as an Indian Industrial School. In the latter capacity, under the inspired guidance of Lieutenant (later Brigadier General) Richard H. Pratt, the Carlisle Indian Industrial School achieved world renown.

In 1918, the Army re-claimed Carlisle Barracks for use as a General Hospital, which gave way to the Medical Field Service School. From 1921 to 1946, it graduated some 30,000 medical officers and corpsmen trained in field operations.

Between 1946 and the arrival of the Army War College in 1951, Carlisle Barracks was the temporary home, at one time or another, of the School for Government of Occupied Areas, the Adjutant General's School, the Chaplain School, the Military Police School, the Army Security Agency School, and the Army Information School, later named Armed Forces Information School.

Since 1951 Carlisle Barracks has been the home of the US Army War College and since 1962 of the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies as well.

### A Brief History of The US Army War College

The US Army War College, senior institution in the Army educational system, was established in 1901. The history of the College has special interest because of the close relationship between the institution and the development of the modern United States Army.

The US Army War College was originally conceived and founded under the direction of Secretary of War Elihu Root. As a result of the principles learned in the Spanish-American War, he saw the need for the establishment of an Army institution where selected officers would be given instruction to prepare them for duties as commanders and staff officers in the highest positions of the Army.

A War College Board was announced in 1902 with Major General S. B. M. Young as President. In 1903, the General Staff was organized with General Young as Chief of Staff of the Army. Brigadier

General T. H. Bliss replaced General Young as President of the War College Board. The first students of the War College assembled in 1904 at Washington, D.C. Prior to the beginning of World War I the War College functioned directly under the Army Chief of Staff.

After the conclusion of World War I the College was reconstituted as the General Staff College. However, in 1921 the name of the College was changed back to its original title of Army War College, and from that time until 1940 the College followed a well developed pattern as an integral part of the Army school system. In 1940, the operations of the War College were temporarily suspended. The buildings and properties of the US Army War College were turned over to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1946, in furtherance of the unification program of the Armed Forces.

In 1949, the Army recognized the need for reopening the War College in order to provide training for qualified officers to fill the requirements for high level staff and command positions. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed that the Army War College be reestablished in 1950 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a temporary location.

The College moved on 1 July 1951 to its permanent location at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. On 1 July 1960 the College was redesignated a Class II activity under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, and on 22 April 1963 was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development.

### STUDENTS

The student body of the US Army War College is composed of approximately 200 senior officers. The majority are Army officers, but there are representatives from the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Department of State and certain other governmental agencies. The average student at the College is a colonel or a lieutenant colonel with 15 to 25 years' service.

### MISSION OF THE COLLEGE

Mission. The mission of the United States Army War College is to prepare selected senior officers for command and high level staff duties, with emphasis on Army doctrine and operations, and to advance interdepartmental and interservice understanding.

The examination of domestic and world environments to develop a sound understanding of the logical application of national power;

The study of military strategic concepts and capabilities and their contribution to the development and projection of United States national power.

The analysis of concepts, doctrine, and organization for future land warfare;

The preparation of a proposed national strategy and a supporting military program; and

The appraisal of academic accomplishment through the medium of a National Strategy Seminar.

Instruction. The curriculum is integrated by the theme of a national strategy and a supporting military program. The basic feature of methodology is the assignment of broad problems to student committees composed of members from all services and other governmental agencies. Recognized leaders in their respective fields contribute to the curriculum as lecturers, consultants, or panelists. The curriculum is further supported by student participation in seminars and discussions; by individual and group research, study, and reports, oral and written; and by trips.

#### GENERAL PLAN OF THE CURRICULUM

The mission of the College requires that the curriculum be oriented toward the future, and transcend the interests of any one service or department of the Government. These broad requirements dictate the need for a curriculum designed to elevate and project the level of student thinking to a consideration both of the tangibles and intangibles which shape the course of the modern world, and which bear directly upon the nation's future security. Consequently, these considerations force a high degree of selectivity in choosing subject matter for inclusion in the curriculum, and also make mandatory the concurrent selection of those educational methodologies which maximize coverage of subject matter. Balance among expanding areas of knowledge important to today's military leader is achieved by incorporating only those which are essential to this appreciation. Studies of particular disciplines or bodies of knowledge are undertaken as they support and relate to these broad requirements, not as blocks or isolated phases of instruction designed to cope solely with an immediate problem or area of current but transitory emphasis.

Full consideration be given to the varied factors of military, political, economic, psycho-social, scientific, and technological elements of power which influence the attainment of national objectives within the international environment. The curriculum provides for the analysis of the nature and interdependence of these factors of national power of the United States in relation to other nations, groups of nations, and supra-national organizations, with emphasis on the use of military power in support of national security policy.

Military planning and programming for and budgeting of defense resources and the development of military strategy are studied in their relationship to domestic and foreign policy as part of a national strategy. Science and technology are studied in terms of the future military power required to attain US objectives in the mid- and long-range time period. Within this context, military coverage in the curriculum stresses the Army in joint, combined, and allied operations.

The substance of the curriculum is interwoven upon a framework or theme--the design of a national strategy and a supporting military program. Eight courses of study and two programs develop the theme. Each course is designed to contribute progressively to considerations which are required for the student conduct of a worldwide strategic appraisal and the development of a sound national strategy and supporting military program during the last course of the academic year. The Thesis Program contributes to the principal curriculum by emphasizing individual research and writing on topics of importance to national security; the Frontiers of Knowledge Program augments the entire curriculum by coverage of the significant advances in the physical, life, social, and behavioral sciences.

Exclusive of the orientation, the curriculum structure is as follows:

- Course 1--The World Environment and International Relations
- Course 2--The United States and the North Atlantic Community
- Course 3--The Communist Powers
- Course 4--The Developing Areas
- Course 5--Management of United States Military Power
- Course 6--Strategic Military Concepts and Capabilities
- Course 7--Science, Technology, and Future Military Power

Thesis Program

Frontiers of Knowledge Program

## CURRICULUM COURSES AND PROGRAMS ORIENTATION

Two days

1. PURPOSE. To provide familiarity with the College's organization and methods employed in accomplishing its educational mission.

2. SCOPE. a. An explanation of the mission and philosophy of the US Army War College.

b. An explanation of the College curriculum, underlying curricular theme, methods of instruction, academic procedures, and the student committee system as utilized by the College in problem solving.

c. An explanation of the facilities and services provided, the activities available, and general policies governing the operation of the Carlisle Barracks community.

d. An explanation of the mission, functions, and responsibilities of the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS) and the Joint Advisory Group.

e. An orientation on the USAWC Thesis Program.

f. An orientation on Library facilities and security procedures.

g. An explanation of administrative procedures.

### COURSE 1

#### THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Approximately three and one-half weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To survey the major problems and trends of the contemporary world.

b. To provide an introduction to international relations and an orientation in the conduct of international affairs.

c. To consider the elements or bases of national power and methods of power appraisal.

2. SCOPE. This course encompasses:

a. A survey of the current world situation in historical perspective, the nature of the East-West conflict, the spectrum of conflict, the underdeveloped world and emerging nations, the

b. Fundamentals of international relations and characteristics of the international system.

c. The bases of national power to include the political, economic, psycho-social, scientific and technological, geographic, and military elements of power; and methods of power appraisal.

d. Instrumentalities for advancing and reconciling the national interests of states, including diplomacy, alliances, military force, economic and psychological tools and techniques, international law, and international organizations.

### COURSE 2

#### THE UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Approximately seven and one-half weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To further an understanding of the national purpose and power of the United States.

b. To promote an understanding and knowledge of the factors, decision-making processes, organization, structure, and civilian-military relationships of the Government which affect, and are part of, the formulation of national security policy, as well as the major problems and issues involved in its development.

c. To establish the bases of power of Western Europe and to define US relationships with this source of power.

2. SCOPE. a. Phase I: The National Purpose and Power of the United States. This phase presents the following:

(1) The American heritage, enduring aspirations, goals, fundamental values, and institutions.

(2) Identification of the major forces and trends at work in the United States, projected trends over a period of approximately 15 years, and the major national problems and opportunities created by these forces and trends.

(3) Appraisal of US elements of national power, including service roles and missions, projected over approximately the next 15 years.

b. Phase II: US National Security Policy. This phase covers the following:

(1) An examination of US national security policy including military policies and objectives contained therein.

(2) A study of the organization of the US Government for the formulation of national security policy and an examination of the roles and relationships of the principal agencies involved, including:

The President and the White House Office.

The National Security Council.

The Office of Emergency Planning.

The Department of State.

The US Information Agency.

The Department of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Intelligence Community.

The Congress.

(3) An assessment of the role of the military officer, his relationships with civilian authority and Congress, and his responsibilities in the policy formulation process. Also considered is the world-wide command and control organization as related to decision-making problems and the execution of decisions by the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of unified and specified commands.

c. Phase III: Western Europe and the North Atlantic Community. This phase includes study of the following:

(1) An examination and analysis of Western Europe to include NATO and the North Atlantic Community.

(2) Identification of prevailing forces and trends in Western Europe, including the spheres of economic, military, and political integration.

(3) A determination of the elements of power represented by Western Europe, Canada, and the United Kingdom; the problems and opportunities confronting the United States in aligning its national power and purpose with these countries toward the creation of a North Atlantic Community united as a base of power in the East-West conflict.

(4) An analysis of US foreign policy toward the North Atlantic Community and consideration of alternatives.

## COURSE 3

### THE COMMUNIST POWERS

Approximately three and one-half weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To develop an understanding of the motivations, resources, capabilities, and limitations of the major Communist powers and their relationships to one another.

b. To analyze US foreign policy with respect to the major Communist powers.

2. SCOPE. This course presents the following:

a. USSR.

(1) The Soviet heritage, enduring aspirations, goals, fundamental values and institutions, and the theory and practice of communism.

(2) Identification of the major forces and trends at work in the USSR, projected trends over a period of approximately 15 years, and the major national problems and opportunities created by these forces and trends.

(3) The tentative objectives which the USSR may be expected to pursue during approximately the next 15 years.

(4) An examination of the Soviet Union's role as a leader of the world Communist movement to include its present and projected relationship with other Communist states, especially Communist China.

(5) An appraisal of USSR national power, to include its military capabilities and strategic military concepts, projected over approximately the next 15 years.

b. Eastern Europe. An examination of the Eastern European Communist states to determine their national power individually and collectively and to assess their international role and contribution to the total Communist effort projected over approximately the next 15 years.

c. Communist China. An examination of Communist China to determine its national power and goals, its military capabilities and strategic military concepts, relations with other Communist states, and to assess its international role and contribution to the total Communist effort projected over approximately the next 15 years.

d. US Foreign Policy. An analysis of US foreign policy with respect to the USSR, the

3. REQUIREMENT. Each committee will prepare a report setting forth its understanding of the national purpose and power of the USSR, Communist China, and Eastern European satellites; identifying the forces and trends at work; determining their tentative objectives for the next 15 years; and analyzing US foreign policy with respect to each.

#### COURSE 4

##### THE DEVELOPING AREAS

Approximately four and one-half weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To examine the developing areas in order to identify current problems and opportunities therein.

b. To consider the relationship of the factors which promote insurgency and the nature, requirements, and objectives of counterinsurgency activities in these areas.

c. To identify and evaluate current United States policies and objectives toward the developing areas.

2. SCOPE. This course accomplishes the following:

a. An examination and analysis of the developing areas of the world--Africa, The Middle East, Latin America, Far East, and South Asia.

b. An identification of prevailing forces, trends, problems, and opportunities in each area.

c. An identification of the historical background of insurgency and counterinsurgency activities; the nature and objectives of these activities; the relationship of military, political, economic, and psycho-social factors which promote them; the organization and roles of US agencies concerned with the attainment of national counterinsurgency objectives; and the impact of insurgency in the developing areas.

d. An identification of the influence of the United States, the North Atlantic Community as a whole, and the Communist states in each area.

e. An identification and analysis of present United States policies and objectives toward each area, including security arrangements.

#### MANAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

Approximately four weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To assess the nation's capability and state of preparedness to support its military forces with emphasis on Army participation.

b. To appraise the continental power position of the United States to determine the availability of defense resources.

c. To develop an understanding of planning, programming, and budgeting processes used to determine and allocate defense resources to programs that ensure the necessary military means are developed, maintained, and managed in furtherance of national security policy.

2. SCOPE. This course presents the following:

a. Study of the strategic military planning conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual services.

b. Examination of the DOD and service planning, programming, and budgeting concepts and presentation of the DOD Program System.

c. Consideration of the techniques of systems analysis and operations research to include political/military and war gaming concepts.

d. Study of the following significant aspects of the nation's readiness for war in conjunction with the related programs of the Defense Program System:

(1) Capability of the United States to develop, maintain, and support strategic retaliatory forces.

(2) Defense of the continental United States, including civil defense.

(3) United States capabilities to develop, deploy, and support the general purpose forces.

(4) Logistics preparedness and capability to support military plans and operations.

(5) Capability of US manpower and reserve forces to support limited or general mobilization under all conditions of warfare.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80-01060A000100010001-6

(7) The Military Assistance Program, to include internal and external security aspects, civic action, and modifications to current objectives recommended to enhance the capability and preparedness to meet counterinsurgency requirements.

(8) Arms control and disarmament objectives, policies, and proposals to determine their effect on US national security and military readiness for war.

## COURSE 6

# STRATEGIC MILITARY CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES

Approximately five and one-half weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To examine US global strategic concepts for employment of military power in support of national strategy and in conjunction with allies, and to examine the requirements for implementation of these concepts.

b. To develop an understanding and an evaluation of the strategic military capabilities of the United States, its allies, and its probable enemies in possible conflict situations which could occur during the period 1965-66.

c. To develop an understanding of counterinsurgency operations and critical factors affecting planning and operations in low intensity conflict.

2. SCOPE. This course provides for studies of the following:

a. Global strategic concepts for the use of military power in conformance with national security policy and in support of national strategy.

b. Allied views of global strategy.

c. Unified and specified command organization, missions, planning and conduct of operations for general, limited, and cold war.

d. Army group and theater army organization, planning, and conduct of operations as part of a unified command.

e. Strategic studies of selected world areas to develop;

(1) A commander's estimate of the nature and the nature of military-political problems of strategic significance in a geographical area which will influence the nature and effectiveness of military operations.

(2) An evaluation of United States current capabilities and determination of feasible means to enhance US capabilities and exploit the vulnerabilities of potential enemies in the areas studied.

(3) An appreciation of coalition warfare.

f. The preparation of campaign plans for certain contingencies to provide for:

(1) An understanding of strategic planning at joint, unified, and combined headquarters.

(2) A practical study of military capabilities in support of cold war objectives.

(3) A study of the implications of limited war operations with respect to general war postures, forward strategy, the adequacy and availability of strategic reserves, lines of communications, base requirements, and administrative support requirements and capabilities.

g. The preparation of a country team plan, in the form of an internal defense plan in a selected country, for dealing with subversive insurgency. Certain selected study groups will prepare a written report identifying critical factors, the general actions required by segments of a country team, and the interrelationship and integration necessary among all elements of a country team to deal with insurgency which might occur or is occurring in the designated area.

h. The conduct of a feasibility test of committee-developed campaign plans. The test is designed to identify factors critical to military operations in a particular geographical area, to assess the military capabilities of the United States vis-a-vis the capabilities of potential enemy states in the same area, and to determine thereby means and methods of enhancing the potential value of military power for supporting US national strategy.

## COURSE 7

# SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FUTURE MILITARY POWER

Four weeks

1. PURPOSE. a. To acquaint students with current and projected scientific and technological

b. To present current views on future conduct and support of land warfare resulting from analysis of projected technological advances for military application.

c. To stimulate creative thinking leading to development of imaginative precepts for conduct of land combat operations in the period 1970-1980.

2. SCOPE. a. The course consists of an examination and analysis of the factors likely to exert a significant influence on the character of future warfare. Land power and the development of ground forces for the long range period are emphasized.

b. The more significant factors to be considered in the time frame under study are:

(1) Scientific and technological potentialities.

(a) Weapons systems, command and control, target acquisition, and mobility for land operations.

(b) Automation in feasibility studies of future weapons systems and command data information display systems.

(c) Nuclear weapons and power sources.

(d) Propulsion and propulsion systems.

(e) Military uses of space.

(f) Naval and air power.

(g) Chemical and biological warfare.

(2) Military threats.

(3) Combat missions of land forces.

(4) Contributions of other services to the land battle.

3. REQUIREMENT. Committees will prepare a series of memoranda which set forth their seminar findings.

#### COURSE 8

#### US NATIONAL STRATEGY AND A SUPPORTING MILITARY PROGRAM

Six weeks

1. PURPOSE. This course consolidates the substance of prior instruction and applies it

2. SCOPE. This course accomplishes the following:

a. A review of the strategic problems and opportunities facing the United States.

b. The development of a proposed national strategy to include the establishment of pertinent national objectives.

c. From the proposed national strategy will be evolved a national military strategic concept, military objectives, and a military strategy to guide United States actions during the next five- to ten-year period.

d. A force structure is then developed, with emphasis on the mid-range period, which will support the military strategy and insure the attainment of the established objectives.

e. The force structure is converted into the DOD program system in order to develop an order-of-magnitude appreciation of the cost in resources of the proposed military program.

f. A National Strategy Seminar is conducted to provide an opportunity to discuss national security and strategy, together with supporting military programs, with distinguished military and civilian guests.

#### THESIS PROGRAM

First to thirty-seventh week, inclusive,  
concurrently with other courses

1. PURPOSE. To afford additional practice in effective writing and speaking on a subject of importance to national security; to emphasize original thinking based on research, considered evaluation, critical analysis, and meaningful synthesis of material related to a subject of importance to national security; to increase individual knowledge; to make a contribution to existing knowledge in a field of interest to the military profession.

2. SCOPE. Individual research, evaluation, analysis, synthesis, and writing are directed at the preparation of a graduate level thesis during the first to the thirty-seventh weeks, inclusive. Each student either: selects a subject from a list of suggested topics published by, or made available by, the Army War College; or, proposes one in a field of special interest to him. Following faculty approval of the student's topic and scope, and appropriate student preparation, each student submits his completed thesis for faculty review, and orally presents a summary of his thesis before a student seminar group.



Third to eighteenth week, inclusive,  
concurrently with other courses

1. PURPOSE. a. To provide a survey of selected subjects on the frontiers of knowledge, including significant advances in the physical and life sciences, world energy resources, and the technological revolution.

b. To stimulate thought on the impact of scientific breakthroughs in a rapidly changing world environment as an aid toward a better understanding of their contributions to national pre-eminence.

c. To provide additional scientific and technical background for Course 7, "Science, Technology, and Future Military Power."

2. SCOPE. This program provides an orientation in the following general fields of scientific inquiry with particular attention to future national security implications:

a. Current knowledge of cosmology regarding the origin, development, and nature of the universe and theories as to its future. Special attention will be given to the prospects for man's exploration of intergalactic space.

b. The life sciences to include recent advances in expanding man's knowledge in the fields of molecular biology and medicine and the nature of life itself.

c. Concepts of the nature of matter and energy to include the most recent findings in the fields of physics and chemistry, analysis of the power requirements and the potential energy resources of the world, and the balance between them.

d. The examination of a scientific field which at the time has special significance due to a breakthrough in the field or a new application of known principles.

e. The impact of science and technology on human affairs with emphasis on the technological revolution. The examination will include a survey of current space technology and cybernetics/automation and their influence on advancing technology.

## METHODS OF INSTRUCTION

In accomplishing the objectives set forth in the mission, the College fosters an atmosphere of academic freedom as an incentive to the spirit of

individual inquiry and as a stimulant to constructive, critical student thought. These objectives are engendered by individual reading, writing, and research; by lectures and group discussion; and by the assignment of broad fundamental problems to student committees for tentative solution.

The educational methodologies employed to achieve the curriculum goals of the College are predicated on a continuing joint faculty-student effort in all aspects of the daily conduct of the curriculum. This relationship is based upon faculty development and supervision of implementation of the curriculum, and upon faculty participation directly with student committees as course advisers in all forms of curriculum activity. Additionally, each faculty member serves as a faculty adviser to a number of students and is in close personal contact, professionally and socially, with his advisees on all aspects of the curriculum to include the Thesis Program.

Visitors, recognized leaders in their respective fields, contribute to the curriculum as lecturers, consultants, and panelists. Members of the faculty possessing special competence make similar contributions. In the pursuit of additional knowledge and in amplification of the subject matter, students have the opportunity to question periods following presentations and during the afterlecture conferences.

Students conduct extensive bibliographic research throughout the curriculum. Course bibliographies are amplified by College-prepared documents which conveniently assemble pertinent selected readings. These readings are intended to stimulate further thought, to serve as reference data, or to highlight certain significant aspects of subjects. They also provide a basis for committee discussion or a guide in approaching assigned requirements.

Readings, lectures, and research are further synthesized by use of seminar periods wherein open discussion is encouraged to ensure that all viewpoints and aspects of the topic are subjected to critical examination by the students, individually and collectively. While dissent is not encouraged for its own sake, the expression of honest individual dissent from group opinion is accorded a respectable place in the conduct of student discussions, as well as in the preparation of written committee studies.

Written committee reports are prepared in most courses. These reports require a correlation of data, principles, and techniques pertinent to assigned problems. Further, preparation of the reports enables committee members to work together in a common educational effort. Presentation and discussion of reports in seminar with members of other committees broaden the educational effect.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

There are important values sought through the Army War College's committee system. Each student faces the challenge of submitting his ideas to critical committee discussion. In turn, he benefits from the knowledge of a group of officers and civilians possessing collectively an extremely wide range of professional experience. Student assignments to committees and committee chairmanships are rotated to maximize the exchange of experience and ideas, to promote acquaintanceships within the class, and to foster each student's ability to participate in and contribute to diverse group efforts.

## LECTURES

Lectures constitute one of the primary instructional vehicles in the methodology of the US Army War College and guest lecturers provide experienced and authoritative views in their field on subjects under study. The analyses and conclusions presented by these lecturers afford important source material for the students in their studies. Normally, lectures are approximately 50 minutes in length followed by a short recess, after which a 30 minute question period is conducted. Following a second recess, or luncheon, 20 to 40 selected students assemble with the lecturer for an afterlecture conference of about 1½ hours duration.

Every effort is made to make available in the Library, as expeditiously as possible, a recording of the lecture presented, so students and faculty may have the earliest possible access to it for reference purposes.


Faculty and students are cautioned that information presented by a lecturer cannot be repeated outside the College. Some lectures are transcribed and retained in the College Library. Transcripts of these lectures are not furnished to any individuals or agencies outside the College without the specific approval of the lecturer in each instance.

For details of audiovisual aids, equipment and facilities available for guest lecturers, see pages 21-23.

## LOCATION

The US Army War College is located in the Cumberland Valley of Pennsylvania at Carlisle Barracks on US Route 11 approximately 18 miles west of Harrisburg. The city of Carlisle is one mile southwest of the Post on Route 11 and 27 miles north of Gettysburg on State Route 34. About two miles east of Carlisle Barracks on US Route 11 is the Carlisle Interchange of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The travel time from Washington, D.C., to Carlisle Barracks by automobile is approximately 2½ hours.

## ROAD NET



## ACCOMMODATIONS

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5  
The Guest House provides comfortable overnight accommodations. The Officers' Club is approximately 300 yards from the Guest House.

## DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME


The College operates on Daylight Saving Time from the last Sunday in April until the last Sunday in October.

## TRAVEL

Key air and railroad terminals are located in Harrisburg. Trans World, United, and Allegheny Airlines fly regularly scheduled flights. The Pennsylvania Railroad also services Harrisburg.

Upon notification of the mode of travel and the arrival time in Harrisburg, vehicular transportation to Carlisle Barracks will be provided automatically. Time of travel is about 30 minutes.

## THE CENTRAL AREA



## AUDIOVISUAL AIDS, EQUIPMENT AND GUEST LECTURERS

USAWC Auditorium, Root Hall

The College Auditorium has a normal seating capacity of 270. The stage is a small one — with platform 32" high, a proscenium arch 30' wide, and with an effective height of 12'. The stage depth of 17' includes an apron-like operating area 8' deep, in front of the screen curtain. Two lecterns are available. The normal lecturer's lectern is at stage right (right hand, facing the audience). Lecterns are equipped with lights and microphones. In addition, shepherds-crook neck attachments with lavalier microphones are available for use by lecturers who desire to move about and occasionally turn away from the audience — such as when pointing on charts, maps, etc. However, normal stage movement away from the lectern is possible without use of the lavalier microphones. The constantly manned audio system is used both to reinforce voices of speaker and questioners, and to record all proceedings.

Sliding tackboard panels for charts up to 10½ feet wide and 9½ feet high are available. Two may be used side by side.

The beaded surface projection screen is 14 feet wide but the proscenium arch limits the vertical dimension of projection to 12 feet. Accordingly, the nominal effective screen size is 12'x12', slightly substandard for the 81' maximum viewing distance.

Projection gear includes a Projection Optics Transpaque overhead projector with long throw lens, for use in the booth; a Beseler Slide King type 3¼"x4" lantern slide projector with both manual and automatic slide changer; 16mm Motion Picture Projector PFP-1 (optical sound capability, only) and Kodak Carousel 35mm (2"x2") slide projector. Both slide projectors can be operated remotely by the lecturer, if desired. However, it is preferable in all cases to provide the local projectionist with a manuscript cued for projections, and to let the projectionist operate the equipment.

Opaque projection equipment is available, but not recommended, unless page-size copy to be used has a minimum letter size of 5/32". If ordinary book, magazine, or typed copy is to be used, quarter-page (about 5"x5") portions can be brought up to legible size in most cases.

A 4'x8' green chalkboard is available for use with ordinary or fluorescent chalks and magnetic aids.

Audiovisual criteria for the auditorium in-  
clude: minimum letter size on nominal  
8"x10" overhead projection (vu-graph) transpar-  
encies; 1/16" on lantern slides; and 2 1/2" on  
charts and other materials to be viewed by re-  
flected light. The test for legibility of a 35mm  
slide is to hold it at 8"-10" from the eyes and in  
front of a light source - if it can be read without  
a magnifier, people in the rear seats of the USAWC  
auditorium probably can read it when projected on  
the screen. Direct copy 8"x10" vu-graph trans-  
parencies made from ordinary typed copy, books or  
magazines do not meet the audiovisual standards  
of the AWC auditorium.

A multi-speed turntable and tape equipment  
operates at 7 1/2 and 16 inches per second.

The College is equipped to provide charts,  
maps and projectuals, or other aids desired by  
quest lecturers. Requests and information for  
their preparation should be forwarded to the Visi-  
tors Bureau, US Army War College, at least two  
weeks prior to date of lecture.

Any desired map can be obtained. There are  
available large painted flat maps for use with  
"blacklight," for the following areas: US; South  
and Central America; Europe; Europe-Asia; Europe-  
Middle East; Africa; Middle East; Russia; South  
East Asia; China; East Asia; the Scandinavian  
countries; and, the World - with either the Atlantic  
or Pacific area in the center.


Both fluorescent tipped pointers and elec-  
trical pointers are available for use with charts.

Minimal lighting facilities are available,  
sufficient to light the lecturer, with control to pre-  
vent washing out screen images. Full stage long  
wave blacklight is available for use with various  
fluorescent materials.


If further information is needed regarding  
any of the foregoing facilities, or, should a com-  
plex presentation requiring additional facilities be  
under consideration, telephone contact with OIC,  
Special Projects and Audiovisual Support Section  
is encouraged. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 243-4141,  
Ext 357.)



AUDITORIUM IN ROOT HALL  
(As seen from right rear)



AUDITORIUM IN ROOT HALL  
(As seen from stage)





**US ARMY WAR COLLEGE**  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

**Schedule of Events  
for the Visit of**

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Accompanied by:  Executive Assistant

**Escort Officer:** Col M. F. Itz, USAF

**Aide:** Lt A. J. FitzPatrick

Guest House Suite

**Quarters:** 208-09, \*204-05  
82-03

**Telephone No.:** X 657,  
\*X 640

**Time and Date**

**Event**

**Place**

25X1

1645 29 Mar 65 Arrival. Met by Col Itz and escorted  
to Carlisle Barracks.

1830 29 Mar 65 Dinner with Commandant  
Guests:  
Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter

Quarters #1

Col Jack B. Gross, USAF, (Harrisburg)  
Col Allen J. Stevens, Jr., USAR Ret (Carlisle)  
Col Houghton R. Hallock, USA Ret (Harrisburg)  
Col M. F. (Mil) Itz  
Mr. V. J. (Buddy) Heyman  
Col J. H. (Jim) King  
Col J. J. (Jim) Freda  
Lt Col J. A. (Jim) Aleveras  
Lt Col K. G. (Ken) Groom  
Lt Col L. D. (Len) Holder  
Lt Col R. L. (Bob) Freeland

0730 30 Mar 65 Breakfast

0830 30 Mar 65 Lecture: "The Long Range Threat."  
Presented by: Lt Gen M. S. Carter

Auditorium, Root Hall

1000 30 Mar 65 Coffee with Commandant  
Guests:  
Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter

Commandant's Office

Col W. W. (Walt) Wendt

Col M. F. (Mil) Itz  
Col Bruce C. Babbitt  
Lt Col Frank J. Walton  
Lt Col L. D. (Len) Holder

1030 30 Mar 65 After Lecture Conference

Room 201, Bliss Hall

Schedule of Events for the Visit of Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter, 29-30 Mar 65,  
(Cont'd)

<u>Time and Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>
1145 30 Mar 65	Luncheon with Commandant Guests: Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 1.2em; margin: 2px 0;"></div> Col M. F. (Mil) Itz Mr. V. J. (Buddy) Heyman Col J. H. (Jim) King	Blue Room, Officers' Open Mess Col Frank L. Schaf, Jr. Col J. J. (Jim) Freda Lt Col J. J. (Jim) Ursano Lt Col K. G. (Ken) Groom Lt Col W. C. (Bill) Abernathy
1315 30 Mar 65	Departure from (Accompanied to Harrisburg-York State Airport by Col Itz)	Carlisle Barracks USAWC Sedan
1345 30 Mar 65	Departure from	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 240px; height: 50px; margin: 5px 0;"></div>


25X1

# THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND  
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES

AND

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



ROOT HALL  
HEADQUARTERS - USAWC - USACDCIAS

*A Brief Narrative*






THE APPROACH TO THE MAIN BUILDINGS. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

# THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

US ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND  
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES

AND


CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



## Coat of Arms

The US Army War College coat of arms, originally approved by the Secretary of War on 6 December 1910, expresses the national and military character of the institution. The American Eagle, holding the traditional olive branch in the right talon, and a bundle of 13 arrows in the left talon, and bearing the escutcheon of the national coat of arms on its breast, is significant of the national scope of the US Army War College. The three five-pointed stars at the top of the shield represent the major combat arms. At the crest is a torch of enlightenment in the grasp of a mailed fist. The motto "PRUDENS FUTURI" expresses the spirit of the school: "PROVIDENT FOR THE FUTURE."





# The US Army War College



## . . . Introduction

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the need for a school to train young men in the fundamentals of the military profession was acknowledged by George Washington with the establishment of the Military Academy at West Point. Almost 100 years later, Elihu Root, Secretary of War in President McKinley's cabinet, similarly recognized the need for the advanced training of officers to prepare them for high level command and staff positions. In response to this need, the establishment of the Army War College was approved by Congress in 1901.

Today, as then, the US Army War College is oriented to the future and to the broad scope of problems encompassed in the term "national security." Now, however, as never before, the problem of national security transcends the interests of any one military service or department of government. Strategy, no longer capable of being expressed solely in terms of land, sea and airpower, must fully consider the many varied factors which influence the attainment of our national objectives. Furthermore, means are as important as ends, for it is realized that a goal which is not projected in terms of resources and obstacles, both abstract and concrete, is unrealistic and sterile. Every effort, then, is made to develop an enlightened point of view, and to broaden the horizon of the student so that he may serve effectively as a well balanced member of the defense team.

To this end, the curriculum, oriented towards the next decade, reflects the soldier-statesman philosophy of our American military tradition. It includes courses designed to prepare carefully selected student officers for duty as commanders or staff officers at the highest levels in joint and allied commands, or in national government positions. But the curriculum is not limited to purely military problems alone. It includes studies of the social, economic, psychological, and political factors which affect our national and foreign policy formulations, strategic studies of overseas areas, and a consideration of many new developments in the fields of science and technology.

To accomplish its mission, the US Army War College gives students an opportunity to explore, to inquire, and to appraise, so that later they can act deliberately. It provides a place, so necessary when disrupting influences are attacking ideas and institutions the world over, where mature officers of all services and their civilian counterparts can come to grips with the problems which face our nation. Here, emphasis is placed on freedom of thought and action. Differences are discussed rather than suppressed. Qualitative learning is considered more desirable than quantitative.

The product of such a program should be a military leader who is alive to the principles of our democratic society and has a world outlook and understanding; an officer who not only knows the practical aspects of operations but also is aware of the many different influences which determine our national defense policy.

## Origin . . .

The War with Spain highlighted the defects that existed in the United States Army. During that unhappy conflict it became apparent that officers in the lower echelons were comparatively well trained, whereas those in positions at the higher levels were almost completely unprepared to handle the problems of sudden mobilization, training, and the widespread deployment of military forces. But the armed services, despite their apparent inefficiencies, had assumed important duties in the Philippine Islands and other parts of the Pacific, and in the Caribbean. Thus there was a growing awareness of the great need for an intensive study of the diversified problems of warfare and the preparation for warfare. Tremendous improvement in Army organization was needed to overcome the confusion of the past and to meet the new responsibilities imposed upon the War Department by the country's new position in international affairs.

Accordingly, Elihu Root, Secretary of War in President McKinley's cabinet, recommended in his annual report in 1899 the establishment of an Army institution that would provide an agency to perform concurrently planning and operational activities for the War Department; i.e., general staff duties; and prepare selected officers for command and staff duties at the highest levels of the Army. Actually, his recommendation was a skillful maneuver designed to fill the specific need at that time for an agency to perform the planning and administrative requirements of the War Department until Congress enacted legislation to create a General Staff.

As conceived by Secretary Root, the word "college" referred not so much to an academic institution as to a body of persons having common interests. The Army War College was to be "...composed of the heads of the staff departments, properly so called, and a number of the ablest and most competent officers of high rank in the Army...these officers to be detailed for service in the college for limited periods so that while the college shall be continuous in records, character, and performance, it shall be constantly changing in its personal elements. It shall be the duty of this body of officers to direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement. In addition, officers should be detailed for some fixed period during service to receive instructions at this college in the science of war, including the duties of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the application of military science to national defense; that provision should be made for the continuance of such instruction by correspondence after the expiration of the period of each officer's detail, and all officers should be invited and entitled to present, by written papers and reports, as a part of the regular course...the results of their investigations, explorations, reflections, and professional scientific work, and upon such special subjects as may be prescribed by the college." Thus it can be seen that Secretary Root regarded the War College not solely as an academic institution, but as a performing agency as well. Members of the War College were to work on current problems then

facing the War Department, not entirely in the theoretical manner of "students," but as general staff officers in the broadest sense.

## . . . Formative Days

In October 1900, General Ludlow's board recommended regulations for governing the administration and scope of work for the War College, but more significantly, the Ludlow board urged the establishment of a General Staff.

Guided by these recommendations, Secretary Root announced on 27 November 1901 a progressive scheme of instruction for officers of the Army. A War College Board was to be set up to administer the program, and the presiding officer of the Board was designated the President of the Army War College. At the same time Washington Barracks (now Fort Lesley J. McNair) in the District of Columbia was designated the permanent home of the College, and Congress made an appropriation for the construction of a building there (1902).

The War College Board was announced on 1 July 1902, and Major General S. B. M. Young was designated as the first President of the Army War College. Temporary offices were established at 20 Jackson Place on the west side of Lafayette Square in Washington, D. C., and in December 1902, the Board moved to 22 Jackson Place. Here it remained until 15 August 1903 when it was dissolved upon the creation of the General Staff Corps.

The formation of the War Department General Staff made it possible for the War College to increase the emphasis on the academic aspects of its mission. General Young left to become Chief of Staff of the Army, and his position as President of the War College was taken by Brigadier General T. H. Bliss.

On 1 November 1903, the War College began to operate under the new War Department General Staff. There were seven officers in the War College, all members of the Third Division of the General Staff (the War College Division). General Bliss, like Secretary Root, felt that the academic aspects of the College's activities had to be integrated with its planning and operational functions, with the latter taking precedence. In a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, he proposed that a small group of carefully selected officers from the General Staff assist the Chief of Staff in making plans for the national defense. In addition, he recommended that other selected Army officers be detailed from time to time to work with the President and the two directors of the War College, and under their direction.

During the 1903-04 session, there were no "students" assigned to the College. The permanent personnel worked on problems for solution by the Commanders of the territorial divisions; they prepared plans for the dispatch of expeditionary forces; and they made arrangements with the Naval War College for joint Army and Navy maneuvers for the following year.

Then, on 1 November 1904, the first annual session of the Army War College opened. The permanent Army personnel consisted of four officers of the General Staff, including General Tasker H. Bliss, the President. One Commander was assigned to represent the US Navy. Nine Army

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5  
officers were detailed as students. Among them was Captain John J. Pershing, who was later to become the most illustrious member of the class.

There was no actual classroom work under instructors. The students were assigned to committees for the solution of problems that were similar to those that were worked on during the preceding year.

These first years set the pattern for succeeding years; but as the College grew, it took on, more and more, an academic climate. Lectures on topics of current interest pertaining to international and national affairs were added to the lectures and discussions which centered around purely military subjects.

## Growth . . .

A series of strategic and tactical problems were introduced in the 1906-07 course, along with field reconnaissance of the battlefields of the Antietam Campaign. Thereafter field trips to the Civil War battlefields were made annually.

In June 1908, the War Department General Staff underwent one of its many reorganizations. Prior to this time, the General Staff consisted of three divisions: the First dealt with the mobile forces, and was actually the executive agency of the Chief of Staff; the Second dealt with information (intelligence); and the Third was charged with preparation of war plans and matters relating to mobilization. The War College was closely identified with the Third Division.


The War College building at Washington Barracks was completed in 1907, and the College moved from 22 Jackson Place in June of that year. The move of the War College to its new location separated it from those divisions of the General Staff which remained at Jackson Place, and the physical separation had a marked effect on the operation of the General Staff. The Third Division, whose major work was done at the War College, found it difficult to carry on its duties of war planning without close contact with the Second Division (information). Thus, the Second Division was moved to the Army War College, and the General Staff was reorganized into two sections: the First continuing as the executive agency of the Chief of Staff; and the Second functioning with two committees—a Military Information Committee and an Army War College Committee, both permanently located at the Army War College.

The College continued to operate with no major change until the National Defense Act was passed in 1916. Under that law, it was mandatory that the President of the Army War College be a member of the General Staff. However, it specifically prohibited the detail of any other officer on General Staff duty as an instructor or as a student at the War College.

Emphasis within the College was changed; there was more attention to theory, to the solution of abstract problems, and to the development of doctrine. The first course under the new policy opened on 28 October 1916 with eight instructors and twenty-one students. Because of the declaration of war on 6 April 1917 the school's activities were terminated May 25th, and classes were suspended until after the war.



ELIHU ROOT. Secretary of War, 1899-1904. Founder of the Army War College.



BRIG GEN TASKER H. BLISS. President of the Army War College, 16 August 1903 - 24 June 1905.




MAJ GEN S. B. M. YOUNG. First President of the Army War College.



FIRST HOME OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE. 22 Jackson Place N. W., Washington, D. C.





THE FORMER ARMY WAR COLLEGE BUILDING. (1907-1940) Washington Barracks, now Fort Lesley J. McNair. This building was constructed as the permanent home of the War College and now houses the National War College.



THE PRESENT US ARMY WAR COLLEGE BUILDING Root Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

## . . . Development

The General Staff was reorganized again in the midst of World War I. The Military Intelligence Branch of the War College Division was moved to the Executive Division of the General Staff. The War College Division was dissolved, and its functions were taken over by the War Plans Division. The new War Plans Division was located at the Army War College, and the Director of the War Plans Division became the President of the Army War College.

In June 1919 the War Plans Division was moved to the War Department at 22 Jackson Place so that it could be closer to the other sections of the General Staff. The College, however, continued under the supervision of the War Plans Division, but its name was changed to the "General Staff College."

There soon developed a clear pattern of instruction. The name "Army War College" was restored in August 1921, and from that time until 1940, the College functioned as an integral part of the Army school system. As its contribution to Army education, a different school, the Command and General Staff College of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducted instruction that emphasized the administrative and tactical operation of divisions and corps. The Army War College, on the other hand, concerned itself with the broad operations of field armies and the higher echelons of the War Department. In addition, its curriculum included political, economic, and social matters which influence the conduct of war.

An average of 16 Army and 2 Navy officers served on the faculty, while an average of 90 officers, including representatives of the Navy and Marine Corps, served as students.

The instructional program was patterned after the graduate program in most civilian universities. Individual research was the nucleus of the system, while committee work was the chief method of instruction. Lectures stimulated or supplemented research and committee work. The emphasis was on a free interchange of ideas.

In 1940, as war drew near and the Army began its widespread mobilization program, classes at the War College were again suspended.

## . . . Revival

After World War II, a board headed by Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow (The Gerow Board) made a study of the entire Army school system. Its work emphasized the interdependence of land, sea, and air forces in modern warfare, and pointed out the need for joint (Army, Navy, and Air Force) instruction in service schools. Special emphasis was given to the need for joint participation in the fields of mobilization of national resources, overall intelligence, and strategy. A National War

College and an Industrial College of the Armed Forces were proposed, and the Army War College building at Fort McNair was placed at the disposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this purpose.

Both joint schools are now in operation. The National War College deals with problems of a strategic nature on the national level, while the Industrial College concentrates on problems of mobilizing the nation's resources.

The gap left by the suspension of the activities of the Army War College was partially filled by the establishment of specialized courses near the end of the regular school year at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Some of the subject matter formerly covered at the Army War College was presented in these specialized studies.

The passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and the experiences gained from three years of postwar operation of Army schools, highlighted the need for a reappraisal of the entire Army school system in order to bring it in consonance with the new structure of the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the Department of the Army designated another board to study and make recommendations on the educational system for Army officers. Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy was appointed President and his report, as approved in October 1949, recommended, among other provisions, that the Army War College be reestablished.

The first postwar class began in August, 1950 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a temporary location until Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, could be readied as the new permanent site. The College moved to Carlisle on 1 July 1951.

Since its establishment, 4,647 students have graduated from the Army War College. As nearly as can be ascertained, at least 1,365 of this number have attained General or Flag officer rank in the various Services. President Eisenhower, Army Generals Pershing, Gruenther, Lemnitzer, Patton, Clark, Ridgway, and Taylor, Air Force Generals Vandenberg and Kenney, the Navy's Admiral "Bull" Halsey, and General Cates of the Marine Corps, number but a few of the Army War College graduates who have distinguished themselves in the service of our Country.

## Operation Today . . .

The mission of the US Army War College currently is to:

prepare selected senior officers for command and high level staff duties with emphasis upon Army doctrine and operations and to advance interdepartmental and interservice understanding.

Standing at the apex of the Army educational system the US Army War College operates as a Class II installation directly under the Department of the Army (ACSFOR). The Department of the Army considers the College to be at the same level as the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The student body of the US Army War College is composed of approximately 200 senior officers. The majority are Army officers, but there is substantial representation from the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Department of State, and certain other governmental agencies. The average student at the College is a colonel or a lieutenant colonel, or equivalent, with about 20 years service.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

The underlying central theme of the curriculum is the design of a national strategy and its supporting military program. To this end, the curriculum divides into eight courses which focus upon the examination of domestic and world environments; the study of strategic concepts and capabilities; the analysis of future military concepts, doctrine, and organization; and the preparation of a proposed national strategy and a supporting military program. The curriculum culminates in a National Strategy Seminar during which a student-developed national strategy and its principal implementing courses of action, with emphasis upon a supporting military program, are examined and refined in collaboration with distinguished military and civilian guests.

In support of the curriculum, the College (entire class) visits the United Nations Headquarters in New York City each year to observe that important organization first hand.

The College employs the student committee as its primary instructional vehicle. Committees work in an environment of intellectual freedom on broad fundamental problems which, as applicable, encompass consideration of particular disciplines or special areas of information. Throughout, logical reasoning is emphasized as the basis of committee solutions.

Selected visitors, recognized leaders in their respective fields, contribute to the curriculum as lecturers, consultants, and panelists. Members of the faculty and members of the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies possessing special competences make similar contributions.

Students conduct extensive research throughout the curriculum. Course bibliographies are amplified by College-prepared documents which conveniently assemble pertinent readings, serve as reference data, or discuss certain significant subjects. These documents serve as a basis for committee discussion or as guides in approaching assigned requirements.


Written committee reports are prepared in most courses. These educational devices require a correlation of data, principles, and techniques pertinent to assigned problems. Further, preparation of the reports enables committee members to work together in a mutual educational effort. Presentation and discussion of reports in seminar with members of other committees broaden the educational effect.

Student assignments to committees and committee chairmanships are rotated to maximize the exchange of experience and ideas, to promote acquaintanceships within the class, and to foster each student's ability to participate in and contribute to diverse group efforts.


In addition to the regular courses, a thesis program stresses the importance of individual research and study. A subject important to national security is investigated by each student in furtherance of his professional training.

The faculty prepares and implements the curriculum and its underlying rationale. However, faculty members, working directly with student committees as course advisers, serve more as counselors than as instructors. Course advisers are primarily concerned with ensuring that each student fully understands his assignment and treats all elements in a logical, thorough, and timely fashion.

The faculty, headed by the Commandant and Deputy Commandant, is composed of selected officers who are qualified in various aspects of the military arts and sciences by virtue of broad study and experience. There are approximately 30 Army officers on the faculty, plus representatives from the Department of State, Research Analysis Corporation, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.



STUDENTS' BUILDING, The US Army War College. Bliss Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.



THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE AUDITORIUM is located on the second floor of Root Hall. It has a seating capacity of 270.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

In 1963, the US Army War College introduced a course for Senior National Guard and Reserve officers. The first such course, designated the Senior Reserve Components Officers Course, was held at Carlisle Barracks 29 January - 12 February 1964 with sixteen National Guard and Reserve General Officers attending. The course is designed to provide knowledge of current global strategic military concepts and capabilities.

In addition, a special one week orientation program conducted by the staff and faculty is presented to Army officers selected to attend foreign service colleges on the same level as the US Army War College.

The US Army War College bases its instruction on the belief that only through critical analysis by informed persons can real progress be made. This concept is aptly reflected in its motto: PRUDENS FUTURI - PROVIDENT FOR THE FUTURE.

## . . . Chronology

1899	The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, stresses the need for improvement in Army organization and recommends the establishment of an Army War College.
February 1900	The War Department appoints a board to draw up regulations for a War College.
26 May 1900	Congress appropriates a small sum for the establishment of the Army War College.
27 November 1901	The Army War College is founded. Secretary Root announces a plan for a progressive scheme of instruction for officers of the Army. Congress makes an appropriation for a permanent home for the War College - the building to be located at Washington Barracks (now Fort Lesley J. McNair) in Washington, D. C.
1 July 1902	A War College Board is announced, with Major General S. B. M. Young as President. Offices are at 20 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
December 1902	The War College Board moves from 20 to 22 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
15 August 1903	The General Staff Corps of the Army is formed. The War College Board is dissolved.
1 November 1903	The War College begins operation under the new War Department General Staff and is called the "War College Division."
1 November 1904	The first annual session of the Army War College is held.
1906-1907	A series of problems in strategy and tactics is introduced into the Army War College curriculum. The War College moves from 22 Jackson Place to Washington Barracks in June.
June 1908	The General Staff is reorganized.

1916 The National Defense Act of 1916 is passed which provides that the President of the Army War College be a member of the General Staff. The War College functions directly under the Army Chief of Staff.

1917 World War I begins. The Army War College school year (1916-17) is shortened, and the War College ceases operation. The General Staff is reorganized again, and the War College Division of the General Staff is dissolved.

9 February 1918 The Military Intelligence Branch of the War College Division is moved to the Executive Division of the General Staff. The function of the War College Division is taken over by the War Plans Division, and the director of the War Plans Division becomes President of the Army War College.

June 1919 The War Plans Division is moved to the War Department building in Washington, D. C., but still supervises the War College. The War College is now reconstituted as the "General Staff College" and continues under the supervision of the War Plans Division.

August 1921 The original name "Army War College" is restored.

1940 Classes at the War College are suspended.

1946 The War College buildings at Fort McNair in Washington are turned over to the National War College and the Industrial College.

1947 The National Security Act is passed.

11 October 1949 The Department of the Army directs the reopening of the Army War College.

August 1950 The first post World War II Army War College class begins at Fort Leavenworth.

1 July 1951 The Army War College moves to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

1 January 1957 Officially designated "US Army War College."

1 July 1960 The US Army War College redesignated a Class II activity under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of Army. In discharging its doctrinal responsibilities, however, the College continues to participate in the Army's Combat Development System monitored by USCONARC.

July 1962 The US Army War College doctrinal responsibilities transferred to the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies.

22 April 1963 The US Army War College transferred to jurisdiction of Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development.

# Presidents and Commandants

PRESIDENTS	RANK	FROM	TO
Young, S. B. M. (Army War College Board)	Major General	1 Jul 1902	15 Aug 1903
Bliss, Tasker H.	Brigadier General	16 Aug 1903	24 Jun 1905
Wotherspoon, W. W.	Lt Colonel (acting)	25 Jun 1905	3 Dec 1905
Barry, Thomas H.	Brigadier General	4 Dec 1905	21 Feb 1907
Wotherspoon, W. W.	Lt Colonel (acting)	21 Feb 1907	8 Oct 1907
Wotherspoon, W. W.	Brigadier General	9 Oct 1907	19 Jun 1909
Bliss, Tasker H.	Brigadier General	21 Jun 1909	1 Dec 1909
Wotherspoon, W. W.	Brigadier General	1 Dec 1909	1 Feb 1912
Mills, Albert L.	Brigadier General	2 Feb 1912	31 Aug 1912
Crozier, William	Brigadier General	1 Sep 1912	1 Jul 1913
Liggett, Hunter	Brigadier General	1 Jul 1913	22 Apr 1914
Macomb, M. M.	Brigadier General	22 Apr 1914	12 Oct 1916
Kuhn, Joseph E.	Brigadier General	1 Feb 1917	25 Aug 1917

## Classes Suspended in World War I (1917-19)

COMMANDANTS			
McAndrew, James W.	Major General	15 Jun 1919	6 Jul 1921
McGlachlin, E. F., Jr.	Major General	14 Jul 1921	30 Jun 1923
Ely, Hanson E.	Major General	1 Jul 1923	30 Nov 1927
Connor, William D.	Major General	20 Dec 1927	30 Apr 1932
Simonds, George S.	Major General	1 May 1932	31 Jan 1935
Craig, Malin	Major General	4 Feb 1935	1 Oct 1935
Grant, Walter S.	Brigadier General	3 Oct 1935	29 Jun 1937
DeWitt, John L.	Major General	30 Jun 1937	30 Nov 1939
Peyton, Philip B.	Brigadier General	1 Dec 1939	30 Jun 1940

## Classes Suspended in World War II (1940-50)

Swing, Joseph M.	Lieutenant General	1 Apr 1950	31 Jul 1951
Almond, Edward M.	Lieutenant General	16 Aug 1951	5 Dec 1952
Barnes, Verdi B.	Brigadier General (acting)	6 Dec 1952	19 Apr 1953
Moore, James E.	Major General	20 Apr 1953	5 Feb 1955
Dunn, Thomas W.	Brigadier General (acting)	6 Feb 1955	26 May 1955
Eddleman, Clyde D.	Major General	27 May 1955	9 Oct 1955
Johnson, Max S.	Major General	10 Oct 1955	15 Feb 1959
Ennis, William P., Jr.	Major General	16 Feb 1959	31 Jul 1960
Dunn, Thomas W.	Major General	8 Aug 1960	16 Mar 1962
Train, William F.	Major General	1 May 1962	30 Jun 1964
Salet, Eugene A.	Major General	1 Jul 1964	



## Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies . . .


The Doctrine and Studies Division, US Army War College, was established as an agency of the Combat Developments Command on 1 July 1962 at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. On 1 August 1962 the agency was redesignated as the US Army Institute of Advanced Studies (USAIAS). On 1 May 1963 it was further redesignated as the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS).

This agency has the mission of preparing studies on broad international, national and departmental level matters affecting the requirements for land warfare. In addition it develops broad tactical and logistical doctrine relating to the organization, employment, and strategic operations of the theater army and major subordinate elements above field army to include combined and joint operations.

The ultimate goal of the Institute of Advanced Studies is to contribute to optimum Army effectiveness. The Institute performs research in the field of future Army operations by preparing and evaluating broad military studies affecting the national security.

Generally, the considerations of the Institute are not bound by service roles, missions, organizations, and precise limitations. Using developments created within the scientific, military, and academic communities as well as industry, the studies disclose capabilities and requirements for the future and engender civilian interest in enhancing Army progress.

The Institute is staffed by military and civilian personnel. Officers are selected on the basis of their experience, military background, and demonstrated talent. They direct and control the study and review effort of the Institute. The civilian staff includes a number of scientists who make a large contribution to the product of the Institute. The individuals are fully integrated into the various projects of the Institute. Their professional status facilitates entree to associates in their respective disciplines in obtaining the most advanced thinking in the arts and sciences.



## Brief History

# of Carlisle Barracks

The first real military camp at Carlisle was established with the arrival of a mixed force of British and Provincial troops, commanded by Col John Stanwix, on May 30, 1757. At first it was simply known as the "Camp near Carlisle," then as "Washingtonburg," and later received its present name - Carlisle Barracks.

On June 28, 1757, Col Stanwix sent the following communication to Colonial Governor Denny:

"I am throwing up earthworks round our camp, and if it may have no other use, it keeps soldiers properly employed, though I apprehend I have undertaken too much; but as it is now supposed to be a camp of continuance, either now or hereafter, I could not make the line less."  
(Colonial Records, Vol VII, p. 629)

An examination of conditions in and around Carlisle in the early 1750's gives explanation for the building of entrenchments here by Col Stanwix. Carlisle was located at the juncture of the North-South, East-West routes of Indian trade. Beginning in 1730, a flood of settlers had crossed into the rich Cumberland Valley. These rapidly expanding settlements encroached on the lands set aside by treaty for the Indians. As a result, the once friendly relations between the Indians and the government began to fall apart, and by 1753 were completely broken by alliances formed between the French and the Indians.

The Cumberland Valley became the scene of many raids by the Indians. An old stockade that had been erected in Carlisle at an early date had fallen into decay, so it was rebuilt and garrisoned to protect the inhabitants. As the Indian raids increased, a new stockade, Fort Lowther, was constructed west of the present Public Square in the Borough, with today's High Street running through its center.

Col Stanwix and his forces had intended to march on to Ohio Valley positions. However, while in Carlisle, he received word that a French-Indian force was preparing to hit the area. He decided to establish a strong defense here, rather than move on, and so constructed the camp which was referred to earlier. In his command was a battalion of the Royal Americans (British 62nd Regiment) and 1,000 Pennsylvania, 300 Maryland and 600 Virginia Provincials. The Royal American Regiment (later redesignated the 60th and renamed the King's Royal Rifle Corps) exists today.

In May 1758, a large depot was ordered built at Carlisle. With the erection of storehouses and barracks, the first actual buildings appeared in Stanwix's camp, the forerunner of present-day Carlisle Barracks. The post was the most secure English position in the West, and served throughout the French-Indian War as a supply base and jumping-off point for expeditions to the west.

With the Indian Wars over, an uneasy peace existed until the beginning of the Revolutionary War. The post became an armory for the manufacture of muskets and ammunition in 1769, and it continued to function as supply headquarters for the forces further west.


By the time the Revolutionary War got underway, Carlisle Barracks had taken its shape as a permanent military reservation. Remote from the actual theatre of operations, garrisoned by troops of Washington's Continental Army, on the direct supply route to the western frontier, and in the center of a rich agricultural area, Carlisle Barracks was designated as the Quartermaster Supply Headquarters for the Western Department. The necessities of war led to further expansion of activities at Carlisle. The availability of many skilled armorers in the area and supplies of iron nearby, plus its strategic location, made Carlisle the logical site for an arsenal.

Resolutions by the Continental Congress in 1776 proposed that a magazine and "elaboratory" be built at Carlisle; work began in 1777. Two Carlisle residents, James Wilson and Brig. Gen. John Armstrong, selected the site for the magazine. Old English Armory buildings were renovated and new construction was begun. The "Public Works" extended over the present day reservation as far as the spring to the north-east side, and was known locally as "Washingtonburg". The works were organized by Col. Benjamin Flower; Maj Charles Lukens was appointed commander. Cannon, shot, harness, gun carriages, barrels, and nails were manufactured and a musket repair shop was operative. Large quantities of powder were stored in the magazine, and the facilities at the nearby towns of Mount Holly, Pine Grove Furnace, and Boiling Springs furnished cast iron cannon balls and shells, as well as cannon castings.

From an early map, it has been determined that Major Lukens' headquarters was located on the same plot of ground as the Commandant's quarters of today. It is also thought probable that this site had also been the headquarters of the Stanwix Camp.

The main magazine, erected in 1777, still stands. It is the second oldest building on the Post and is now known as the Hessian Guardhouse Museum. The Guardhouse was reputedly built by Hessian prisoners captured at the Battle of Trenton and sent by Washington to the Barracks for "any suitable labor." The oldest building on Post is the Mill Apartments, believed to have been built between 1761 and 1768.

It is fitting that Carlisle Barracks is now the home of the Army's senior educational institution, since it is the oldest United States military post and it was also the location of what is believed to be this Service's first educational institution, a school for artillerists established in 1777. In February of that year Congress resolved:



GROUND PLAN OF PUBLIC WORKS AT WASHINGTONBURG.  
NEAR CARLISLE, 1778-1784

laboratory at Carlisle, receive twenty-five dollars monthly additional pay for teaching the laboratory art to such officers of the Artillery as shall be sent to him; that two thousand dollars be sent to him to pay his company and recruit it to one hundred men according to the wishes of General Washington."

(Congressional Archives)

From 1777 to 1781 the Public Works were operated at full capacity and were the main reliance of the Army for ordnance materiel. Col. John Davis, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Army, had his headquarters here during this period.

In 1779 new buildings were erected, but in 1781 business at Carlisle started downhill; men and material were transferred to other places and activities waned until only a caretaker remained.


This quiet lasted until 1791 when the Army was expanded and Carlisle became the Recruiting Center and Ordnance Center. A high point in the post-Revolutionary period was George Washington's visit on October 3, 1794. After his proclamations had failed to quell the "Whiskey Rebellion" uprisings, he gathered a force of from 10 to 15 thousand troops here and marched against the four rebellious western Pennsylvania counties.

In 1801 the government purchased the Carlisle military reservation it had been renting from the heirs of William Penn for all these years. The land was bought for \$664.20 and included:

"...27 acres and 108 perches, exclusive of the old mill lane."

(Original Deed)





1863



1913

#### DEVELOPMENT OF QUARTERS #1

A severe fire destroyed barracks and officers' quarters in 1806 and the troops left. A company of artillery arrived and stayed for a short time in 1808, then the post was again abandoned until the War of 1812; recruits were processed here again and the Public Works got a reconditioning at that time. This continued until the end of the War of 1812. Various troops moved through the post until 1819, when the barracks came under a caretaker once again. Except for brief use as a Navy recruiting center in 1828, the quiet continued until 1838.

From its start in 1838, under Capt. E. V. Sumner, until 1861, the School of Cavalry Practice existed at the post. Hundreds of well-trained cavalymen (both Union and Confederate as it turned out) were schooled at Carlisle Barracks.

In 1839, Capt. Samuel Ringgold arrived to train artillery recruits. He was relieved in 1842 by Maj. C. Wharton, 1st Dragoons, who was replaced the same year by Capt. S. U. Washington, 4th Field Artillery. Command changed again in 1844 with the arrival of Lt. Col. C. A. May, Cavalry. In 1846 command of the post went to Lt. A. Parker Porter, when May and others marched to the Mexican Front. Colonel May returned in 1847 and the post again became a Recruiting Center and Cavalry Depot. Col. Philip St. George Cooke assumed command in 1849 and remained until 1852.

Between 1850 and 1860 a number of serious fires broke out at the barracks, destroying a number of buildings.

The sounds of war in 1861 had immediate repercussions at Carlisle Barracks; troops began to pour in once more and supply centers were reactivated. Capt. D. H. Hastings took command on 16 Sept 1861 as "Superintendent, Mounted Recruiting Service."

Several "false alarms" of raids by the Confederates on Carlisle occurred in the next several years, but in June 1863 the 17th Virginia Cavalry arrived in the city. Maj. Hastings, then commanding the Barracks, "Vacated Carlisle Barracks in the face of the enemy, June 25, 1863, having no means of defense . . ." The Confederate troops set up headquarters at the Barracks, requisitioned supplies and then quietly departed on June 29th.

In early July, Confederate General J. E. B. Stuart marched on Carlisle, Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith, with the 21st and 22d New York Militia, was in command of the Barracks. Stuart fired on the city and one of his subordinate commanders, General Fitzhugh Lee, fired the Barracks. According to a newspaper account of the day, ". . .not one of our citizens was injured. Some eighteen of the soldiers were wounded but none were killed."

After the Civil War, the Barracks processed recruits through April of 1871. It was in that year also that the War Department published orders ending the cavalry station at the Barracks.



INDIAN STUDENTS AT WORK


After eight quiet years, the Carlisle Indian School was started at the post under its founder and first Superintendent, Lt. Richard H. Pratt. In the 39 years of its existence, the Carlisle Indian School grew rapidly, and in addition to academic studies, the Indians were taught the mechanical arts, farming, cooking, sewing and many other practical courses.

It App to the School of Education, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-5000. 200015

Sept. 1, 1918, the Carlisle Indian School was discontinued and General Hospital 31 took over

Since 1920, Carlisle Barracks has probably been the site of more, and more varied, education

In February 1946 the Army Information School, later the Armed Forces Information School, was



GENERAL HOSPITAL 31 AT SQUARE IN CARLISLE, WORLD WAR I

The School for Government of Occupied Areas opened here in 1946 as did the Adjutant General's School. Both stayed less than a year.

From February 1947 until 1951 when it was moved to Fort Slocum, N.Y., The Chaplain School was located at the post.

For almost two years, from January 1947 until November 1948, the Military Police School operated at Carlisle Barracks.

In April, 1949, the Army Security Agency School was moved here from Arlington Farms, Va. It remained until April 1951 when the school was moved to Ft Devens, Mass., as the Army Security Training Center.

Carlisle Barracks' significance as one of the outstanding "school posts" for two centuries makes it today a fitting location for the Army War College, the Army's highest educational institution. In the spring of 1951 the Army War College moved here from Ft Leavenworth, Kan. where it had been reestablished in 1950.

The main cantonment area of Carlisle Barracks is approximately 4/5 of a mile long and 3/5 mile wide, containing 216.82 acres. Other areas owned by the government, for which the post is responsible, are one farm, Stanwix Manor and Stanwix Apartments; this brings the total acreage of the Reservation to 402.84 acres on which are located 328 buildings.

Today, Carlisle Barracks operates as a Class I installation under the Second U.S. Army. The Commandant, US Army War College, is also the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies as well as the Commanding General, Carlisle Barracks.

## . . . The Hessian Guardhouse Museum


The Hessian Guardhouse Museum was built originally as a powder magazine in 1777, and used to store all powder and stores which were moved to Carlisle from Baltimore when the Maryland city was threatened by the British during the Revolutionary War.

No record shows when the powder magazine became a guardhouse. It is almost a certainty that the building remained a magazine during the Revolutionary War period; presumably it was converted to a guardhouse during the first half of the 19th Century. The first positive documentary reference to the building as a guardhouse is on a map of the post dated 1870.

During the time of the Carlisle Indian School, a concrete guardhouse was built on the site of present main gate entrance. The old guardhouse was thereafter called "The Hessian Guardhouse" to distinguish it from the guardhouse at the main gate. This probably was the origin of the present title.


The Hessian Guardhouse opened as a museum on Army Day, April 6, 1948.







The structure measures 70 by 22 feet, outside dimensions, and its native stone walls, lined with brick, are four feet thick. The vaulted roof is also of stone, covered by timbers and tin. The roof is 8½ feet high at the eaves and 12½ feet at the top of the arch. The interior is divided into three main rooms, and at the west end of the building are four cells. The doors on the cells are thought to date from the late 1700's.

Several changes have been made during the years, including piercing new openings in the walls and cutting windows in the outside plank doors. At one time a chimney and ventilators adorned the roof, and a covered porch was located on the west side. These have now been demolished, leaving the original stone building of Pennsylvania limestone.





PROPOSED NEW ACADEMIC FACILITIES  
(Artist's Conception)



Notes Used at Speech to the Army War College on 30 March 1965

Free World Problems ~~EXTRA~~  
really nothing compared  
to Communist Bloc -  
"My opinion"  
Asked Staff to  
prepare a World  
Roundup -  
→ Read IT's ←  
Frightening Series  
of disturbances -  
active and  
incipient -  
I'm paid to be  
discouraged -  
Few Examples

My Trip re SVN / 9  
+ Sihavanta

Grimo: Internal Problems -  
2 hrs. Kwangsi Yunnan -  
Glum on SVN -

Macapagal - re Sukarno -  
re Huks vis-à-vis VC  
and populace / democracy

Thailand - Pro-west -  
PM Phanom Cambodia -

Beauties of getting  
out into the field -

Intra Govt Working Relationship  
SAIGON -

Cuba :

11.10

Refer to paper -  
SAM problem 11/2

Brazil -

Refer to paper -

---

Fair Shake from  
Newspapers -  
Castro 19 April Speech  
SVN casualties  
CIA "Area Release"

---

Norwegian Amb. Wife

Expert now - but 10  
one back from Saigon -

Tell  
Stereo Story ?

General Carter:

This notebook contains material for your use in preparing for the Army War College speech at 0830 on 30 March. It is divided into 5 parts and you will want to arrange matters so as to cover the parts in a total of 45 or 50 minutes. (I have made no effort to tailor the material to your timing since you will want to turn much of the material into your own words.)

"I." is a section devoted to the political and economic outlook in the USSR and China in the 1970's, plus a brief look at what we think the state of the Sino/Soviet relationships will be. This passage has been reviewed by Sherm Kent and was prepared essentially by [REDACTED]

STAT

"II." is [REDACTED] suggestion which he thinks is tailored just right to the audience and which repeats a favorite McCone thesis.

"III." deals with the hardware threat in the 1970's and was prepared by [REDACTED]. Sherm Kent has looked it over.

"IV." is cards which you used a year ago at the Army War College to cover the work of the Agency, checks and balances, etc. ★

"V." is a briefing rundown of world trouble spots. It will be available Sunday evening and the Watch could deliver it to your house at that time, or you can wait until Monday.

In addition to all this, I will have an updated global situation notebook for your background in the round table discussion.

HK


*A Returned to file of Army War College speech of  
23 April 1968*

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

The attached draft was originally written at 20 pages for 20 minutes, but timed reading indicated that at a measured delivery of about 17 lines per minute, the entire draft would take just under 30 min.

The optional cuts indicated in blue pencil remove a total of 10 minutes. If you have already covered the Soviet military estimates in your earlier portions, the cuts indicated in green ink eliminate another 3 minutes.



28 March 1965

(DATE)

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

STAT



The Soviet Union

In our consideration of the Soviet Union today, we may tend to focus on the dislocations and the immediate puzzles arising from the dismissal of Khrushchev, the unknown quantities of Brezhnev and Kosygin, the agricultural failures, and the gradual but obvious slowdown in the rate of industrial growth. In the area of hard intelligence on military capabilities, we find that the United States is holding an edge of two-and-a-half to one of three to one or better in practically every major category of strategic offensive weapons. We can list a consistent string of failures in the Soviet planetary space effort, no matter how much mileage their propaganda may get from their spectacular successes in manned orbital flight. 2700

In our estimates, as I indicated when I was discussing the nature of the threat to the United States in the future, we have to put more stress on basic trends and the long-term outlook. The annual package of National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet military posture adds up to the overall conclusion that the Soviet Union is engaged in a dynamic, sophisticated military program, emphasizing quality rather than quantity, and making progress in almost every important sector.

We must make the logical assumption that the Soviets are putting a major effort into the search for a breakthrough of some sort--for instance, in the field of anti-ballistic missiles--which could change the present balance of power.

Here are some of the principal conclusions of the new Soviet estimates:

3:00 —

--New and improved ICBM's are being developed, and deployed in hardened launchers in a more dispersed pattern.

--The Soviets are producing new and improved submarines, and are showing increased capabilities of long-range operations. The new submarines are both conventional and nuclear-powered, armed with both ballistic and cruise missiles. They have an initial operational capability for submerged launch of ballistic missiles.

--There is energetic research and development on anti-ballistic missile systems. Some ABM deployment may already be under way, and there is a strong possibility that the Soviets are directing their efforts toward an anti-satellite capability.

--Tactical strike forces, both on the ground and aloft, are being equipped with increasingly advanced and more powerful weapons, both nuclear and conventional.

4:00 —

Few, if any, of the Soviet military programs appear to be on a crash basis. They do, however, reflect a determination to achieve qualitative advances in military power, to enhance the international strategic power of the Soviet Union.

(In our analysis of the Soviet Union,)

We have little doubt, furthermore, that the Soviet economy--whatever its weaknesses--can continue to support whatever efforts the Soviet government considers necessary in the fields of defense and space. There are major problems in the allocation of funds, of manpower, of critical resources generally. The Soviet leaders have openly admitted that they are going to have to invest heavily in agriculture. There are indications that the new leaders are just as aware as Khrushchev was that,--after nearly 50 years on their painful road to Utopia,--the Soviet consumer must be given a better share of the national product. At the same time, however, the Soviet economy is still growing even if the rate of growth has slowed down. There is no evidence that the Soviet military effort will be denied any resources it needs. 5.00

We are inclined to doubt that the present two-man leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin has long-term prospects. For one thing, Kosygin has long been rated a competent technician, economist, and planner, rather than a major power factor. For another, neither man is so strongly entrenched as to be without rivals, and in comparison with a one-man dictatorship or a troika, the two-man team would seem to invite more rivalry and contention.

For the present, the new leadership appears to be taking a deliberate and rational approach to problems. Some of Khrushchev's policies, experiments and decisions have been reversed, but not just because they are associated

with Khrushchev. On the contrary, some of the experiments he began are being continued even though they are radical by Marxist-Leninist standards--for instance, greater managerial autonomy in some industrial branches. 6:00

~~[Except for the rehabilitation of some officials who had been arbitrarily dismissed by Khrushchev, and the firing of Lysenko and some of his quack scientists, personnel shifts have been limited. It may be that the new regime realizes that personnel shakeups are most likely to bring rivalries and power struggles to a boil, at a time when there are vital policy problems to be resolved.]~~

In foreign policy, the Kremlin is naturally preoccupied with Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Our reporting, reinforced by Gromyko's behavior during his recent London talks, suggests that relations with the West and such issues as the German problem are frozen in status quo for the time being.

Any discussion of major trends in the Communist world today is incomplete without at least a mention of the change over the past two or three years in the relations between the Soviet Union and its satellites. 7:00  
The bloc is not breaking up, but there is a belligerent new nationalism among the East Europeans. They are still Communists; they still cooperate with Moscow, and in most cases look to the Kremlin for leadership.

The new departure is that, within the framework of basic Communist objectives, the East European countries increasingly want to put their own national interests ahead of the interests of the bloc as a whole, and particularly ahead of the specific interests of the Soviet Union where there is a conflict.

[ We have seen evidence of this in the debates over the nature of Communist solidarity; in discussion of the economic integration of the Soviet bloc; in the insistence of some satellites for trading with the West rather than Moscow in search for better goods and prices; and even in overtures for better diplomatic and cultural relations with the West and specifically with the United States. ]

Even without the Sino-Soviet dispute, what was once a monolithic Communist world run from Moscow is tending to turn into a kind of Commonwealth of Communist nations. This began under Khrushchev, and--possibly because he felt unable to crack down at the time--Khrushchev took a relatively liberal policy toward the developments. He may have deplored the trend, but he did not stop it. ]

[ The new Kremlin leadership probably realizes that since Khrushchev's ouster the chances for instability and independent policies in Eastern Europe are as great or greater than before. The dispute with Peiping makes relations with the satellites especially sensitive. ]

### The Sino-Soviet Dispute

As for the present status of the Sino-Soviet dispute, I can give you one very interesting indicator: Diplomats in Moscow have been picking up reports that the Chinese are impeding the rail shipment across China of Soviet military equipment for North Vietnam. One version is that the Chinese refuse to let Soviet technicians accompany the shipments. 9:00

Now, if this report is true, it shows how determined Peiping is to keep Moscow from increasing Soviet presence and influence in Communist Asia. [The Chinese by such actions would lay themselves open to some fairly effective criticism in world Communist circles.]

If it is not true [--and we know for a fact that the report itself is being spread around Moscow--] then the effort to plant the rumor is a measure of Soviet political warfare against the Chinese. At the same time, it provides a handy pretext for delaying deeper Soviet involvement in the Vietnamese fighting, [while Moscow can continue to insist it is trying to help the North Vietnamese.]

The fuss over the demonstration by Chinese students against the U. S. Embassy in Moscow is another indicator of just how poor Sino-Soviet relations are at present. This is matched by a bitter Peiping attack on the Soviet leaders in regard to the March meeting of world Communist delegations in Moscow. The Chinese made it clear that they are not interested in even a limited relaxation of the feud. 10:00

We have reports, incidentally, that the dispute is not limited to speeches, editorials, and conferences, but is having its effect along the Sino-Soviet border. There has apparently been an increase in both Soviet and Chinese security measures and military posture along the common frontier over the past several months.

[ Since the Soviets induced a sizable defection of an ethnic minority group in Sinkiang, the Chinese have been settling reliable Chinese in the border areas, according to these reports, and moving unreliable tribes back into the hinterland.

Since June, some of these reports claim, both the Chinese and the Soviets have dug and manned trenches along the Soviet-Manchurian border near the Chita-Harbin rail line---as much as 60 miles of trenches on the Soviet side.

11:00

We learned last August that the Soviets had deployed an armored division near the border north of Vladivostok, astride a main railroad into China. The Soviets are said to be clearing trees from a strip 700 to 1,000 feet wide along some 200 miles of this border.

Since last fall we have had indications of a new Soviet ground forces division near the border west of Khabarovsk, and possibly another division in Khabarovsk itself. Sensitivity of the Soviets over Khabarovsk is suggested by the fact that they created the incident there which led to the expulsion of our military attaché, Colonel

SECRET

26 March 1965

The USSR in the 1970s

With respect to the Soviet Union, it seems to me that we can  
detect a few fairly durable trends. No one can call these trends  
absolutely irreversible, but they are gaining strength and ought to  
be in the forefront of our minds.

In developing physical power -- and by that I mean economic  
strength and military might -- the USSR is likely to enjoy a steady  
and solid growth. In the mid-1950s, when GNP rose by six and sometimes  
seven percent per year and Soviet sputniks and ICBMs first appeared  
upon the scene -- this growth of power seemed phenomenal to many.

But it is now becoming clear that time and maturity are catching up  
with the USSR, that its growth curves are not holding to the kind of  
steep angles which would enable them to "overtake" the US, in some

*But bear in mind that the USSR will clearly have sufficient economic strength to support its military needs.*  
sense, during the next decades. In short, the challenge is real and

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

formidable but not unmanageable, and the key variable is not some mysterious dynamic source of Soviet growth, but our own performance.

Political trends depend more on human will and are harder to foresee. Nevertheless, both the Communist party and Soviet society are moving steadily away from complete one-man dictatorship based on the daily use of terror. If we take this as the hallmark of Stalinism, it seems to me that only a wholesale convulsion of Soviet politics could produce a return to those dark days, and the chances of this *we feel* are slight and declining.

This is, however, a far cry from a prediction that democracy will triumph in the Soviet Union of the seventies. A certain evolution will probably go forward, giving a greater voice to an expanding elite in various policy matters. But what the West really hopes for is that general public opinion should become so influential that it lays restraints on the nation's foreign policy. This will come about only

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

*if at all during our times*  
gradually, and in the seventies it probably won't progress far enough to make a crucial change.

There will be more change, however, in the international situation which confronts the USSR. Moscow has no ready means of stopping the growing trend toward independence in Eastern Europe, and it is going to have to reconcile itself to relations with its former satellites which are not much different *from* those which prevail among alliances generally. It is also going to discover, I believe, that underdeveloped nations, while they can often readily be turned against the West, cannot so easily -- perhaps cannot at all -- be persuaded to proceed on to join a Soviet camp and submit to its discipline. The more the USSR has to deal with this kind of world, in which it accepts the permanence and independence of other governments, the less we may be troubled with those larger Soviet ambitions which arise from notions of world revolution.

- 3 -

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~SECRET~~

The most important factor in this process, of course, is what happens in relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

*Lets*

Before turning to that, however, I ~~want to~~ look at the prospects for China itself.

~~SECRET~~

26 March 1965

Communist China in the 1970's

Communist China's fate in the next decade is a more uncertain  
proposition than that of the USSR. China is still in the early  
stages of its Communist revolution, and the enormous problems which  
convulsed the USSR in the 1930's are present in China in perhaps even  
greater degree: the Peiping regime must feed its vast and rapidly  
growing population, generate sufficient production for economic  
growth, and pass political power on to new leaders. These problems  
will probably have become acute a decade hence, with accumulating  
economic difficulties coinciding with a time of political troubles --  
as the present group of "Long March" veterans gives way to a new and *perhaps*  
less single-minded generation.

We nevertheless cannot take much comfort from such a future. True,  
the above problems -- or war -- could collapse Communist authority  
in China. But if this does not occur, and I think the chances are

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

perhaps better than even that it will not, Communist China will still be there, its weight in Asia and the world having grown over the decade. China will probably have survived and prospered enough that its size and power will have an even more intimidating effect on most of its Far East neighbors than at present. It will probably have near-universal diplomatic acceptance as the government of China. It will probably have a developing nuclear capability, perhaps roughly equivalent to those of the UK and France. It will doubtless have considerable influence -- for evil -- in the underdeveloped world. China's new leaders will probably carry on much of their predecessors' ambitions, arrogance, and hostility toward the US and USSR. *In result,* I think we may be faced with a Communist China tending to enjoy dynastic China's position of paramount influence in much of East Asia, though still frustrated in its greater ambitions by the power and vigilance of the US, Japan, and the USSR.

SECRET

26 March 1965

Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970s

Given the likely course of their societies over the  
next decade, it seems a good bet that the USSR and Communist  
China will be antagonistic competitors. *Indeed,* Nationalistic ?  
friction, ideological pretension, and competition for doctrinal  
authority and superior influence abroad will make effective  
alliance between them impossible. The precise form of their  
antagonism could range from uneasy alliance to border warfare.  
But I would stress that the particular degree <sup>of</sup> such antagonism  
may not have significantly different result for the US, since  
each of the two Communist powers will doubtless still *be*  
trying to undermine the American position in the world -- and  
at times seeking to outdo the other in the process.

There might be one possible exception to this in the event  
that the Soviet leaders should come to believe that Communist

China was likely to become a greater long-range threat than

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

the US. I see no sign that Moscow will come to such a view in the foreseeable future, but I do feel that events may make this a possibility. This is not to say that the USSR might seek to ally itself with the US, only that it might feel it prudent to modify certain of its disruptive efforts against the West. But beyond such specifics, a continuing and unresolved Sino-Soviet conflict may in time weaken the doctrinal confidence of both Moscow and Peiping in world revolution and bring national interest increasingly to the fore in their foreign policies.

Bear in mind always, however, that our own policies, whatever they may be, will have a compelling influence on the Communist world in both camps.

- 2 -

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

9 March 1965

STAT

DRAFT OF SPEECH FOR GEN. CARTER

THE LONG RANGE THREAT

INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of the intelligence community, a  
"very long range" projection of the strategic threat is a period  
of up to five years. Even this is done with much trepidation, with  
the last two to three years being cloaked in varying degrees of un-  
certainty. The fact of the matter is that the potential impact of  
factors which can modify a projection are too great to permit a  
"long term" projection beyond two or three years with any degree  
of confidence. Nevertheless, as I will discuss later, the intelli-  
gence community is continuing to experiment with means whereby pro-  
jections of threat models for periods of up to ten years can use-  
fully be made.



~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-2-

Another general point to keep in mind is that the projection of threat is largely a projection of the course of military development in the Soviet Union. Although attention is being given to Communist China, on a current basis, little has as yet been done to project this threat beyond a period of 2-5 years. With respect to the European Satellite nations, the primary estimative focus has been on future developments in their political relationship with the Soviet Union and the subsequent effects to be expected on the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.

#### THE PROJECTION OF THE THREAT

Before discussing the composition of the threat as the community now sees it, I thought it would be best to give you gentlemen a brief review of the mechanisms whereby the intelligence community produces its views on the long range threat.

The most authoritative projection of the Soviet threat is that given in the National Intelligence Estimates. These are the best

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-3-

*Sources of Intelligence*

estimates of the United States Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. In a series of estimates,

the various components and weapon systems of the Soviet military forces are projected for a period of 5 years, either with a single value or with a greater degree of uncertainty indicated by a range.

As part of this process there is an explicit projection in general terms of how the Soviet leaders will continue to view the world--

~~it should be noted that in the military estimates there is a tendency to emphasize the world being considered without substantial~~

~~change~~ The estimates are based on current intelligence and evidence of trends as suggested by past actions, current developments, Soviet enunciation of national strategic policy, and to a certain degree, on an implicit conclusion that the United States posture will not change significantly during the period.

Within recent months, a second approach based on the development of educated assumptions has been developed. While the intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-4-

assumptions for planning cover the same period as that in the estimates, the effort has been to expand the detail with respect to numbers, characteristics, manning and costing of individual current and follow-on weapon systems. Such data are essential for war gaming and operational analysis to determine the projected effectiveness of proposed US systems.

~~The projected assumptions are based in large measure on the same data which is considered in the NIE's but with the concept of "assumption" being considered to give somewhat greater flexibility in the presentation of future developments, the probability of which are considered less likely than those estimated with confidence but which should still be called to the planners attention.~~

The intelligence community is also experimenting with methods for projecting the threat out to 10 years. At present this is being done in the form of hypothesized alternative Soviet force structures. Though they are not approved by USIB as estimates of how the world

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-5-

might in fact look ten years hence, they are forwarded to planners as being feasible models of the direction in which the Soviet strategic concept may come to be changed during this period. These projections are based on the same material that have gone into the other two documents, but with greater emphasis on the possibility of change than of the maintenance of status quo. This approach also emphasizes the possibility of weapon systems being developed out of continued scientific research. In this latter connection, reliance is placed on US analog. Moreover, some account is taken, implicitly rather than in a formal explicit exercise of potential Soviet reaction to future US weapons development and deployment.

FACTORS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THREAT PROJECTION

A major problem which must be kept in mind in discussing threat models and projections of threat is the consideration to be given to estimates and assumptions concerning effects expected from changes in certain major imponderables. These cover such broad subjects as the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-6-

continuing political inter-relationships between the US and the Soviet Union, the projection of Soviet economic capabilities, a view as to the Soviet potential for technological progress, and, finally, the impact of historic inertias in the enemy's military establishment. While I do not intend to discuss any of these points in detail I believe it would be useful to indicate briefly the importance of some of these problem areas relative to the extent and nature of the future threat.

In all projections to date, the intelligence community has focussed on the Soviet Union. Other Communist countries have been considered as adding too but not subtracting from the potential Soviet power posture. It is readily apparent that the cohesiveness of the Communist world is a critical factor in determining whether Communist power is a sum of the strengths of the individual nations or is in fact a series of separate power groupings which under certain circumstances might even be divided or caused to react one against the other.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

-7-

Certainly any projection of this complex subject must also consider

the obverse, namely, the strength and cohesion projected for the

Western world. In a word what this results in is the formulation of

broad assumptions as to the shape of the political world in which a

military threat model is to be constructed. It is the intelligence

community's view at the moment that the farther the future is projected

are  
the greater/the chances that the political assumptions will be wrong.

Another prime consideration in projecting the future of Soviet  
power is economic development. With future weapon systems apparently

costing substantially more in terms of physical and trained human re-

sources, the ability of the Soviet economy to meet these demands in

addition to those posed by the civilian side is a critical question.

It is felt that there is little value in projecting a worst case

threat situation when upon analysis it would appear to be economically  
infeasible.

Another most difficult factor relating to projections of future  
weapon systems is the rate and direction of scientific and technologi-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-8-

cal progress. ~~History tends to indicate that~~ new and improved  
weapon systems evolve from the continuing research activities of a  
scientific world. Thus it is not sufficient merely to project  
follow-on systems within the same families of weapons. With the  
ever increasing rate of accumulation of scientific knowledge, great  
attention must be given to possible weapons application.

Finally, there are the practical implications of military organi-  
zation. Development of the threat can be significantly affected by  
such factors as the balance of power among the various services, and  
the extent to which historical view of strategy will offset or slow  
down the introduction of advanced weapon systems. These factors may  
influence the allocation of resources between the various components  
of the military establishment and in this way may define the composi-  
tion of the threat irrespective of the apparent logic of doing it in  
another manner. A consideration of the military establishment must  
also take into account the evolving strategic doctrine as seen from

~~TOP SECRET~~

-9-

the enemy country. In the case of the Soviet Union it is most important to keep in mind the threat posed by the presence of non-Communist -- and perhaps non-Soviet Communist countries -- around its periphery.

THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT AS PROJECTED INTO THE 1970's.

Now having told you why the crystal ball may be small and have many imperfections, let me give you a general view of the Soviet threat as projected into the '70's. It is imperative that the threat to the US be considered as being compounded of both Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces. It is not enough to consider only that capability which can attack directly. First with respect to strategic offensive forces, it would appear that the Soviet threat whether against mainland US or against US allies and bases overseas will be composed largely of ballistic missiles, primarily land based but also carried on submarines. The ballistic missiles themselves will probably include some with a very large warhead and many more with a relative smaller payload. They will be based in hardened



~~TOP SECRET~~

-10-

silos and through time have improved characteristics -- accuracy and reliability. One new approach that has been taken into account is the possibility of developing a ballistic missile system in which a single booster can be used to launch multi-warheads to widely separated targets, each warhead having an accuracy which would make them an effective system against hardened targets.

There will probably continue to be an aerodynamic threat including medium range bombers, with improved air-to-surface missiles, and submarine launched cruise missiles. While no new heavy bomber is in view, such development cannot be totally discounted. If such a system were to appear it could be either supersonic high altitude or low altitude, and in either case have improved air-to-surface missiles.

The composition of the strategic offensive forces is influenced to some degree by the capabilities designed into the strategic defensive systems. For example should the deployment of a defensive system cause the enemy to believe his offensive weapons systems have a high degree of protection, his calculation of total strategic

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-11-

weapons required for action against the US would be reduced. ~~The~~  
~~destruct-before-launch factor in planning calculations could be~~  
~~reduced thereby reducing the number of weapons to be programmed to~~  
~~meet the weapons down requirements.~~ On the other hand, any such  
degree of confidence in the future would require an integrated  
defense system. To be included would be weapons effective against  
supersonic aerodynamic vehicles at low and high altitudes as well  
as against ballistic missiles protected by increasingly sophisticated  
penetration aids.

It is probable that Soviet defenses against aircraft and other  
aerodynamic weapon systems will continue to improve. This will be  
achieved through modifications and replacement of their surface-to-  
air missile systems, manned interceptors, and command and control  
systems.

The Soviets have ~~undoubtedly~~ been given much attention to develop-  
ing an ABM system and there is strong evidence that they have begun  
some deployment. Nevertheless, the threat to US missiles posed by

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

-12-

*Breakthrough?*

possible Soviet ballistic missile defenses is extremely difficult

to estimate, let alone quantify. Not only is there the normal gap

in intelligence information but there is the question of determining

system effectiveness as it might be calculated against a US attack

capability at any point in time.

The Soviets will probably also continue to seek means to defeat

US seaborne systems, primarily the Polaris submarine and the attack

carrier. To this end, at the present time they seemed to have put

considerable effort in developing nuclear and conventional attack

and cruise missile launching submarines for these purposes. At the

present time there are no known break-throughs in the submarine detec-

tion field which would seriously jeopardize the near invulnerability

of Polaris submarines on station. However, the Soviets by comprehensive

approaches may be able to chip away some of this invulnerability.

The threat posed by Soviet general purpose forces is almost

entirely related to US positions and allies around the Soviet peri-

phery. Thus the extent of this threat is related to some degree to

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

-13-

the state of US alliances and the threat posed to the Soviets by NATO or the countries of Western Europe by themselves. The size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces may also become greatly influenced by the developments in the Soviet relations with Communist China. It is also possible that the Soviets will seek to enhance their capabilities to project their conventional military power overseas, as the US now does. Given these circumstances and taking into account the inertias in the Soviet military system we believe that there will not be a radical change in the number of divisions available.

In addition to projecting Soviet strength in the various systems now in being or under development, we must also attempt to estimate, or at least suggest weapon systems which are not now in the forces but which may come into the force. The urge to slip into scientific fiction must be guarded against at this point. What can be accomplished is a continuous review of US and Soviet scientific

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-14-

efforts to see if any lines of research can become the basis  
for a future weapon system. An example of the results of this  
activity is our view that death rays, based on lasers technology  
do not appear probable as a Soviet weapon system before 1970.

THE IMPACT OF THE PROJECTED THREAT ON US MILITARY PLANNING.

Intelligence estimates have always entered into national plan-  
ning. But since the advent of the more systematic approaches ~~in~~  
~~developed~~ by Mr. McManama, the threat models projected by the intelligence  
community have taken on an increased importance. They now are intro-  
duced directly into the processes for developing weapon systems require-  
ments and tasking their effectiveness. In fact the Department of  
Defense as a consumer continues to press the intelligence community  
to project its estimates farther into the future and to narrow ranges  
of uncertainty. For the reasons discussed above we find it difficult  
to fulfill in all respect these desires.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

You will have noted in what I have just said that there are some signs of hopefulness that various kinds of pressures on the Communists may bring Communist leaders in time to a peaceful and rational approach to world problems. These may well be vain hopes, and the various seeds that have been planted may have <sup>been</sup> planted in infertile soil. Certainly the planning of American policy cannot be based on the assumption that all will <sup>be</sup> peace and light.

The Cold War, which has lasted since the end of World War II, may come to be looked upon by future historians as the real World War III. The Cold War has been marked by thrusts and probes, parries and counter probes, and has involved back alley fighting, foment of rebellion, and subversive efforts of every conceivable nature and kind. The Communists are clearly expert at this and <sup>as</sup> the nuclear stalemate continues, this Government must brace itself for a continuation, if not an intensification, of all forms of Communist political actions -- both covert and overt, as well as for outbreaks of what the Communists choose to call "wars of liberation."

The American Government has got to increase its capabilities, not only to match but to be superior to Soviet and Chinese capabilities <sup>in</sup> and political action as well as in military hardware.

This is the challenge that faces each of you in this audience today. You will be moving into positions of leadership in fighting the fight of the Cold War. You will be making <sup>the</sup> policies. You will be planning the thrusts and counter-thrusts. And I submit that you will need, in order to do this job, to have the

- 2 -

support of an American Government whose machinery is well oiled, free of bureaucratic obstacles, and with all components engaged in unified effort.

Successful prosecution of the Cold War depends upon the skillful <sup>use</sup> ~~planting~~ of all of the capabilities of this Government, including <sup>those of</sup> the military, <sup>of the</sup> State Department, <sup>the</sup> AID, and <sup>these agencies</sup> CIA. Each of ~~you~~ has unique assets and capabilities, <sup>and</sup> but the total U.S. effort must be the sum of these capabilities. It will be up to you to bring the full weight of American power and strength to bear on the problems which will confront <sup>us.</sup> ~~you~~.

Vietnam

Turning to the Vietnamese problem, don't let the drama of the air strikes on North Vietnam, the hullabaloo over the use of nauseating gas, or the fact that we've gone several weeks without a coup in Saigon divert you from two main facts: Firstly, there is still no sign of a stable, effective government leadership. Secondly, the military situation in South Vietnam is still grave, and is deteriorating rapidly in the northern provinces. 12:00

The stable and effective leadership is needed, not only to give direction and drive to the war and the pacification effort, but to provide a background for convincing the Vietnamese peasant that he has a stake in this war. [Our Director likes to say that one of the problems is that there aren't any Paul Reveres. This doesn't just mean people who will identify the hidden Viet Cong agents; it is exasperating and dangerous that the Viet Cong can deploy main force units in battalion strength into attack positions without any warning reaching the government forces.] A Vietnamese peasant is probably not eager to inform on the Viet Cong when he realizes that the price may be having to watch the Viet Cong disembowel his family on their first opportunity. He is even less likely to do so, however, if there is no effective government with which he can identify, and which can show it wants to do more for him than the Viet Cong can offer. 13:00



As for the immediate military situation, the Viet Cong presence in the north has built up steadily to the point that in at least four provinces today government control is limited to all intents and purposes to district capitals; the Viet Cong control the countryside. In one province, government officials have even drafted contingency plans for withdrawing completely from the province. [As an indication of the significance of this threat, I need only mention that these provinces form a solid line across Vietnam from the coast to the Laotian border, with our base at Da Nang situated between these provinces and the 17th parallel, cut off from the rest of South Vietnam.] 14.00

There has obviously been intensified infiltration from North Vietnam into these northern provinces. The confirmed Viet Cong main force strength now is carried at ~~37,200~~ <sup>38,400</sup> men. We estimate that the actual strength in South Vietnam is probably at least 45,000 in some 50 battalions, backed up by about 100,000 Communists in militia-type guerrilla forces.

The U. S. and South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnam have given some lift to morale in South Vietnam, but so far we have received no indication whatsoever that they are inducing the North Vietnamese to reduce their support and supply and direction and reinforcement of the guerrillas in the south.

Indonesia - Malaysia

[Indonesia is on my list of countries where it would be easy to let emotions, rather than our national security interests, dictate my reactions.

The United States played a significant role in the country's postwar transition to independence from the Dutch. Our aid has been one of the main props of a chronically floundering economy. We presided over the negotiations which brought West New Guinea under Indonesian control. Our press has hailed President Sukarno as the George Washington of his country. We provided the initial equipment for the Indonesian armed forces. 15

In return, [Indonesia has sacked our U.S.I.A. libraries and finally closed them, placed our commercial interests under government control just short of expropriation, advanced the Chinese Communist line in propaganda and international conferences, harassed our personnel, and assailed our policies as imperialist.

Sukarno and the large Communist party, which is Peiping-oriented, appear to have the same objective-- to clear the country of Western influence. The principal difference appears to be that the Communists are in a greater hurry, using political pressure and mob action to make the government move farther and faster against American interests. 16

Sukarno for a long time has maintained complete control of the country by balancing the military, the

Communists, and the non-Communist parties, mainly Moslem groups. Recently, however, political elements opposing the Communists have been banned and their newspapers suppressed. The military is increasingly infiltrated with pro-Communist officers who are trying to push General Nasution to the sidelines. The Communists have persuaded Sukarno to begin the creation of an armed militia of workers and peasants. Sukarno is a sick man, and the prospects are that when he dies, the Communists or the politicians who work with them, like Foreign Minister Subandrio, will take over.

[Sukarno's discussions with us appear to be governed by the late Sam Rayburn's story of the constituent who asked: "What have you done for me lately?" Yesterday's aid has no bearing--his yardstick is our attitude in his current dispute with Malaysia and the British Commonwealth.] 17

The factor that draws the line between an emotional reaction and a determination of our national security interests is the potential of Indonesia. Here is a country of more than 100 million people, potentially rich in important natural resources, amply equipped with weapons by the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent by Communist China, extending more than 3,000 miles across the South Pacific. Its armed forces exceed 300,000 men. This is too rich a prize to be allowed to fall into Communist hands [in a fit of pique,] without making every effort consistent with our

The issue today is Malaysia, the federation sponsored by the British in an effort to unite Singapore with the Malayan peninsula in such a way that the predominantly Chinese population of Singapore could outvote the Malays on the mainland. [Indonesians have argued to us that the natives of North Borneo do not want to be in the federation, and that the concept is so weak and vulnerable that it exposes Borneo to the Chinese Communists. Actually, there can be little doubt that Sukarno and the Indonesians consider the Malaysian federation, under British sponsorship, a barrier to their own expansion. They hope to take North Borneo as they have taken West New Guinea, and as they will sooner or later take the Portuguese half of the island of Timor.] 18:00

[If you look at Malaysia on a globe rather than a flat map, it is even clearer that Malaysia does in fact form a barrier between the Asian mainland and Indonesia. The Chinese Communists are probably as interested as Sukarno in preventing any strong federation in this position.] 19:00

Sukarno would like to break up Malaysia without open warfare, and has been using guerrilla infiltrations, sabotage and terrorism, both on the mainland and in Borneo, to bring the Malays to a conference table. There remains, however, a real danger of escalation. Peiping's encouragement of Sukarno increases this danger. Indonesia still looks to the Soviet Union for major military and economic aid, but its rapport with Communist China in policy and objectives

Cyprus

Cyprus is another thorny problem for which there is no easy solution.

The Greeks and the Turks have been antagonistic for generations. Put Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on an island together, with the Turkish Cypriots in a four-to-one minority, tell them to govern themselves, and you have a crisis. [The Greek Cypriots are unwilling to give the Turkish Cypriots an effective veto power; the minority is unwilling to trust itself to a majority government without such safeguards] [The blood which has already been spilled makes it almost impossible to begin rational discussions of such possible compromises as partition, a federal system, or putting the island under the somewhat less hostile rule of the Greek mainland.] 20-00

There has been an uneasy lull in the fighting on the island since the United Nations presence was established. This has rested in part on a balance between the Turkish air superiority, and a force of some 12,000 Greeks sent to Cyprus partly to restrain Makarios and his Greek Cypriots, partly to deter any Turkish invasion.

Now this balance is endangered by Soviet arms which Makarios has obtained. So far, Egypt as a middleman has delivered six torpedo boats, 32 T-34 tanks, antiaircraft guns, and field artillery. Some surface-to-air missile equipment may have been delivered--we have observed it

The Greek government is as uneasy about this as we are, and apparently has ordered at least some of the ships bringing the SA-2 equipment to suspend deliveries. [Greek troops originally trained by us for NIKE batteries were to go to Egypt to train with SA-2 equipment, rather than permitting Greek Cypriots under Makarios to control these weapons. This training may have been suspended, but there is no guarantee that Egypt or the Soviets will not ship the equipment in channels which Athens cannot control, and send Egyptian or even Soviet crews to man the missiles.]

The Turks see their capability to intervene, either by air or by invasion, going rapidly downhill, and are becoming desperate.

[The Communists, both on and outside Cyprus, reject union with Greece because they consider this would put the island under NATO. Makarios endorses such a union in public, but is probably reluctant to give up independent control to submit himself to direction from Athens. The Turks are too bitter at present to consider that in recent years Turkish minorities in Greece have fared better under government from Athens than their compatriots in Cyprus.] 22:00

Whatever we do, both Athens and Ankara consider that the United States has let down an ally by not giving wholehearted support to each of two opposing viewpoints/ This problem, I am sure, will still be waiting for you in June.

### The Congo

In the Congo, the general military situation at the moment is favorable for the government. Colonel Hoare's South Africans, with Congolese army units, began their campaign to seal the northeastern frontier on March 15. They have taken Aru, the main entry point for equipment reaching the rebels from Uganda. So far, they have met little resistance. [Most of the tribes in the area dislike the rebels, and Prime Minister Obote in Uganda apparently does not feel sure enough of his support to intervene. In February he had sent some Ugandan soldiers across the border to work with rebel units.]

23:00

There is still a big job to do, however. We still have no record of effective performance by the Congolese Army without stiffening by South Africans or Europeans. Arms can still reach the rebels from the southern Sudan, which has been the main staging area for some 60 planeloads of equipment provided to date by Egypt, Algeria and Ghana. There is also a supply line across Tanzania and Lake Tanganyika.

Lately the Sudanese government has been preventing the arms shipments intermittently, probably out of concern that some of the weapons might fall into the hands of dissident tribes in the southern Sudan. The Congolese government has begun an armed patrol on Lake Tanganyika which may impede the ferrying of rebel supplies by that route.

There is still, however, a large concentration of rebel soldiers along the western shore of Lake Tanganyika in the area around Fizi, where the rebellion began and the tribes favor the rebels. The Congolese Army has been unable to make a dent here, and we believe that if the rebels were to get a stiffening of trained soldiers from the radical African states, along with Soviet and Chinese Communist arms and supplies, this might be more than the white mercenaries could handle. So far, we have no confirmation that any foreign troops are with the rebels inside the Congo, but Ben Bella has threatened to send some Algerians.

24:00

[Tshombé is in the driver's seat politically. His grouping of parties will probably dominate the national and regional elections which will run from now to the end of April. Short of the rebel leaders, there is no alternative in sight to his leadership. Some of the more moderate African nations are beginning to support him diplomatically.]

[The radical Africans and the Communists, however, appear to be determined to keep the pot boiling, and even without a rebellion, the Congo faces economic and social problems which are going to require substantial outside help for some time to come.]

25:00



Cuba

Finally, after touring the trouble spots we have in the far-flung reaches of the globe, we have to come home to the problem just 90 miles away, in Cuba.

On our best evidence, there are now only about 2,000 Soviet military personnel on the island, operating as a military assistance and advisory group as instructors, technicians, and advisors.

When the Soviet combat units were withdrawn, they left behind them a Cuban military establishment which, in terms of armament and size if not necessarily in training, can probably handle any threat to Castro except an outright invasion by the United States.

The Cubans appear to have taken over control of the major weapons systems left by the Soviets--the surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense and ground-to-ground missiles, the KOMAR missile boats, torpedo boats and subchasers, jet fighter aircraft, and a profusion of tanks and field artillery.

26.00

Without on-site inspection, we cannot say with certainty that the Soviets did or did not withdraw all of the strategic missiles which could have reached the United States. [We continue to receive a steady stream of allegations, mainly from refugee sources, that they did not. Most of these allegations break down on closer analysis.]

25X1

[REDACTED]

We also have no credible evidence

that any Communist submarines have been in Cuban waters.

On the other hand, the Cuban armed forces are showing increasing effectiveness in dealing with exile raids and with the occasional and isolated incidents of armed resistance on the island itself. The Cuban ability to support subversion and insurgency elsewhere in Latin America is also giving us growing cause for concern-- and fortunately is also causing growing recognition of the danger on the part of our sister republics in Latin America.] 24:00

Venezuela survived one major wave of insurgency, and now faces another. Cuban-backed insurgents are active in Colombia and Guatemala, and have a significant potential for armed rebellion or guerrilla warfare in Honduras, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, to mention the main danger spots. Extremists trained and supported by Castro have a potential for sabotage and terrorism in Panama. Guerrilla organizations have been active in Brazil and Argentina.

[In most cases, Cuban support has been limited to training, propaganda, funds and guidance. Cubans tell the dissident groups that weapons and funds can be obtained in their own countries by attacks on police stations and banks.] 28:00

[It is obvious, however, that the Cubans get along  
those militant  
better with ~~the~~ Latin American extremists who look to  
Peiping for guidance than they do with the more cautious  
Communist leaderships who take their orders from Moscow.  
The Cubans have probably concluded that other revolutions  
are necessary in Latin America to ensure that the Cuban  
revolution doesn't wither on the vine. The large arms  
cache found in Venezuela last year demonstrates that the  
Cubans are willing to stretch their cautious policy on  
supplying weapons whenever an opportunity appears to  
justify the risk.]

Cuba is a gateway to the Western Hemisphere for the  
Communists, but it has become an extremely expensive one.  
We have considerable evidence that Moscow would like  
Castro to reach some accommodation with the United States  
which would eliminate or at least reduce our attempts to  
isolate Cuba economically from the Free World. There is 29:00  
no evidence, however, that the Castro regime is willing  
to make any concessions whatsoever to move toward such  
an accommodation.

[Castro may try to reopen the Guantanamo issue soon,  
but in the United Nations or some other international forum  
rather than on the island itself. Now that Cuba controls  
the surface-to-air missiles, there is always the danger  
that Castro might incite a new crisis by firing on one  
of our U-2 flights. For the long-term, however, the  
principal and continuing danger lies in the Cuban capability  
for supporting insurgency and revolution in Latin America.] 29:30  
Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

[I believe that little purpose would be served today by giving you the standard current intelligence briefing. Events move so fast in this age of flaps and crises that yesterday's briefing must be completely revised if it is to be used tomorrow---and a presentation of current intelligence which may have been of great use to the National Security Council last week, this week may be of value only for the files, to reappear as a document for the historians in 1970 or 1975. We tend to live by the headlines: yesterday we won a battle or made a breakthrough, and the situation was improving; today we took a licking, and the outlook is grim.

By the calendar, however, it is already spring, and before spring is over,] you gentlemen will <sup>soon</sup> have graduated and returned to the flaps and the crises and the situation reports. I can assure you that some if not all of today's critical situations will still be with you at that time, and accordingly it does appear appropriate today to take a look at some of the basic trends and fundamental issues of the major trouble spots, no matter how short-lived last night's cables may be.

1:00

DDCI TRIP TO ARMY WAR COLLEGE

STAT  
STAT  
  
STAT  
DDCI and [ ] will take off from DCA at 1600 on 29 March [ ]  
[ ] Arrival at Harrisburg will be about  
1645. Will be met by War College staff car for 30 minute drive to  
Carlisle, arriving about 1715.

25X1

DDCI and [ ] will be billeted in the guest house near the  
Officer's Club. General Salet will host an informal dinner in his quarters  
for DDCI the evening of 29 March.

DDCI's address to the War College students is set for 0830 on  
30 March. The address is to last between 45 minutes and 1 hour followed  
by a short break, followed by a 30 minute question and answer period.  
There will then be another short break followed by a 50 minute meeting  
of 20 to 40 students with DDCI for roundtable type discussions. This will  
be followed by a luncheon which will begin about noon and end about 1300.

[ ]

STAT

The formal title of the address is "The Long Range Threat." The  
college has asked that emphasis be given to the threat to the U.S. posed  
by the Soviet Union, China, and other Communists states in the 1970-1980  
period. There are draft remarks on this subject which will be designed to  
cover about 15 minutes. An additional 15 minutes worth of notes on cur-  
rent world trouble spots will be available, and DDCI's notes from last  
year's appearance at the college will be available for discussing the  
Agency, checks and balances, organization, etc., for another 15 minutes.

Remarks can be at the TOP SECRET level, and they have been  
prepared accordingly.

26 February 1965

Major General Eugene A. Salet  
Commandant  
U. S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear General Salet:

Many thanks for your letter of 5 February in connection with my talk at the War College on 30 March.

I presently plan to arrive on the late afternoon of the 29th and leave immediately after lunch on the 30th. Unless weather interferes, I would fly in and fly out. Because of other family commitments at the time, Mrs. Carter will not be with me.

Unless it gives you some sort of a problem, it would be helpful if I could bring with me my Executive Assistant,  He is a GS-16 and does most of my thinking and all of my work. He is also paid by the Agency to keep track of me and see that I don't get too far off base.

I guess there are enough people at the College who know me to let you know that I am the shy, retiring type and have difficulty living with "pomp and circumstance." However, if things have changed drastically since I was there last year, I will conform to whatever you say!!

Faithfully yours,

is/M.S.C.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director


MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

✓ 1 - DDCI (Speech File)

1 - FR



**US ARMY WAR COLLEGE**  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

5 February 1965

Dear General Carter:

I am delighted to learn that you will be able to address the Army War College on Tuesday, 30 March 1965. Your coverage of "The Long Range Threat" is a highlight of Course 7 and we are looking forward to your presentation.

For background information on the other lectures and speakers during Course 7 you may wish to scan the enclosed extract of the Course Directive.

I hope that your plans to arrive on the afternoon of 29 March may be realized. If so, an informal dinner in your honor will be held that evening. In the event that Mrs. Carter plans to accompany you, she is also cordially invited. We also hope that you will have luncheon following your address with a few members of the faculty and student body.

It will be a great pleasure to welcome you again as a guest of the Army War College.

Sincerely,

EUGENE A. SALET

Major General, United States Army  
Commandant

1 Incl  
as

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

COURSE 7

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FUTURE MILITARY POWER

1. Purpose. a. To acquaint students with current and projected scientific and technological achievements and their application to military power--land, sea, and air--in the period 1970-1980.

b. To present current views on future conduct and support of land warfare resulting from analysis of projected technological advances for military application.

c. To stimulate creative thinking leading to development of imaginative precepts for conduct of land combat operations in the period 1970-1980.

2. Lectures and Scheduled Speakers.

a. L7-01: "The Future of Space" - Dr. Wernher von Braun, Director, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, 15 March 1965.

Scope. An enunciation of the future space effort of the United States as currently approved for implementation; a visualization of future space projects that are within the realm of possibility; and an evaluation of the benefits to be derived by the military from current and future space projects.

b. L7-02: "The Long Range Threat" - Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 30 March 1965.

Scope. An enunciation of the very long range strategic threat to the United States as it is now conceived and announced to the planning agencies of the Department of Defense. The impact of this threat on future military strategy; and the validity factors that must be considered in evaluating the 1970-1980 threat to the United States posed by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other Communist-oriented or dominated states will be discussed. Where possible, stress will be placed on the capabilities of potential enemies of the United States to capitalize on their scientific and technological potential to shift the balance of military power.

c. L7-03: "Industry's Challenge to the Military" - Doctor Thomas O. Paine, Manager, Technical Military Planning Operation, (TEMPO), 31 March 1965.

Inclosure 1



Scope. An examination of the role of private industry in the development of military power. Discussion of the application of science and technology in industry's research and development programs related to defense production. Industry's views on Defense Research and Development Plans and Programs. The impact of industry on the trends and forces which impinge upon decisions by the Department of Defense.

d. L7-04: "Future Weapons Systems of the Army" - Lieutenant General William W. Dick, Jr., USA, Chief of Research and Development, 1 April 1965.

Scope. To familiarize students with the Army Research and Development system and its current and projected programs. The weapons systems and other equipment envisioned for the 1970-1980 period, the contributions of science and technology to achievement of increased range, lethality, responsiveness, and mobility of the 1970-1980 period fire support weapons of the Army are studied.

e. L7-05: "Combat Developments and Future Land Warfare" - Lieutenant General Dwight E. Beach, USA, Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command, 6 April 1965.

Scope. To present an outline of the current and projected research and development projects being considered by the Combat Developments Command; the operation of CDC to accomplish its assigned mission; and a general forecast of future Army organization, equipment, and tactics for the 1970-1980 time period.

f. L7-06: "Future Weapons Systems of the Navy" - Rear Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, Director, Development Programs, 7 April 1965.

Scope. To familiarize students with the Navy research and development program, forecast advances in Naval weaponry and ships in the 1970-1980 time frame, and project the impact of these improved scientific and technological developments on the conduct of future naval warfare.

g. L7-07: "Future Weapons Systems of the Air Force" - Major General Charles H. Terhune, Jr., USAF, Commander, Aeronautical Systems Division, 8 April 1965.

Scope. To outline the Air Force research and development program, forecast advances in scientific and technological fields, and discuss future strategic and tactical weapons systems of the 1970-1980 period to include manned aircraft, improved missiles, warheads, and penetration aids.

h. L7-08: "Strategic Air and Sealift Forces" - Lieutenant General Richard D. Meyer, USA, Director, J-4 Logistics, Joint Staff, 9 April 1965.

Scope. A survey of the technical developments, trends, and prospects for air and sealift forces in the 1970-1980 period. The prospective capabilities of these forces compared to anticipated requirements for CONUS-based land, sea, and air forces available for deployment.

i. L7-09: "Air Mobile Concepts" - Major General William B. Rosson, USA, Director, Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force, 13 April 1965.

Scope. To enunciate the current air mobility concepts of the Army and Air Force; to project these concepts into the future insofar as the organization and equipment of air assault and TAC elements are concerned; and to outline the major advantages and shortcomings indicated to date in recent mobility tests and evaluations.

j. L7-10: "Missile Defense, Present and Future" - Major General John G. Zierdt, USA, Commanding General, US Army Missile Command, 14 April 1965.

Scope. An examination of the contribution of science and technology to the anti-missile missile problem to include a review of the characteristics and capabilities of NIKE-X and alternative systems now under study. The long range weapons systems mix to counter or deter the threat of the multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missile, submarine launched missile, offensive satellite threats, and the air-breathing threat will be considered. Consideration will also be given to concepts of surveillance and space weaponry in the next decade which may be applicable to the defense of North America and to utilization of automation in command and control data information display systems.

k. L7-11: "Chemical and Biological Operations" - Brigadier General Fred J. Delmore, USA, Commander, United States Army Edgewood Arsenal, 20 April 1965.

Scope. To review the chemical and biological agents and delivery means which may be available to US military forces during the 1970-1980 period. Broad concepts for the employment of nonlethal and lethal agents will be presented; probable protective devices and equipment will be discussed; anticipated force requirements for chemical/biological units will be outlined; and major problem areas to be resolved prior to US employment of these weapons will be covered.

1. L7-12: "Future Military Electronics and Communications" - Major General David P. Gibbs, USA, Chief of Communications-Electronics, 21 April 1965.

Scope. To present a forecast in the field of military electronic and communication equipment; a summary of the current prototype development program in the military communications field; and a prediction of the type electronic and communication equipment that may be employed in the 1970-1980 time period.

m. L7-13: "New Developments and Future Concepts in Nuclear Weapons Technology" - DASA Team, 22 April 1965.

Scope. To discuss new advances which affect weapons currently in stockpile and under development; trends in design of weapons in the engineering phase of development and beyond, but not yet in stockpile; advances which made radically new weapons possible and the evolution of new weapons. To outline the impact of new technology upon comparative costs for a given yield; to discuss projects still in the conceptual or feasibility phase of development and ideas originated in the laboratories and within the services for the application of new techniques in weapons design.

n. L7-14: "Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Propulsion" - Doctor John S. Foster, Jr., Director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 23 April 1965.

Scope. A survey of technical possibilities in the 1970-1980 period for the use of nuclear energy in weapons and as a means of propulsion and a power source. The limitations imposed on scientific advancement in nuclear weapons areas by the Limited Test Ban Treaty will be enumerated, and probable developments in the application of nuclear power to propel land, sea, and air, and space vehicles will be described.

3. Committee Requirement. Prepare a brief study (approximately 10 pages) embodying committee consensus on operational doctrines and materiel (major items only, such as nuclear carriers, CX-4, etc.) for future land warfare in the joint context. Consider course content, bibliographic material and recent studies such as Army-75, TASTA-70, COSTAR, RODAC-70, and STRATMOVE-69. The study should emphasize imaginative concepts and should, where applicable, list alternative opportunities afforded by these concepts.

26 January 1965

Major General Eugene A. Salet, USA  
Commandant  
U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Dear General Salet:

Thank you for your letter of 13 January and the invitation to me to address the U. S. Army War College on the morning of 30 March on "The Long Range Threat." I am looking forward to the occasion and as the time nears, my Executive Assistant, [redacted] will be in touch with Col. King concerning the arrangements. By referring to last year's correspondence I had with Bill Train, you will appreciate that I will not follow the text you have suggested!

I am currently planning to arrive at Carlisle Barracks in the afternoon or evening of 29 March and plan to return to Washington following my address on the 30th, or if I'm invited, after a martini and a light lunch!

Faithfully yours,

Distribution:


- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI speech file *u/learn*
- 1 - EA/DDCI chrono
- 1 - ER

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

O/DDCI/[redacted] (26 Jan 65)



**US ARMY WAR COLLEGE**  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

13 January 1965

Dear General Carter:

It is a pleasure to confirm the invitation discussed by Mr. Narke and Colonel King, to address the US Army War College at 0830 hours on 30 March 1965, on the subject, "The Long Range Threat." This is a key lecture in Course 7, "Science, Technology and Future Military Power," and we are most happy to have you "set the scene" for the course.

The purpose of Course 7 is to acquaint students with current and projected scientific and technological achievements and their application to military power--land, sea and air--in the 1970-1980 time period. The course is designed to stimulate creative thinking leading to development of new and unexplored concepts for the conduct of warfare in the 1970-1980 era.

I am enclosing a brief statement of the purpose and scope of your address. However, this is only a suggestion, and I hope that you will feel completely free to address this subject as you deem appropriate.

We greatly appreciate your continued support and look forward with pleasure to welcoming you again as a guest of the college.

Sincerely,

EUGENE A. SALET

Major General, United States Army  
Commandant

1 Incl  
as

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

THE LONG RANGE THREAT

L7-02

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter

30 March 1965

Purpose and scope of the topic. An enunciation of the very long range strategic threat to the United States as it is now conceived and announced to the planning agencies of the Department of Defense. The organization and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency to accomplish the formulation of the very long range strategic threat; the impact of this threat on future military strategy; and the validity factors that must be considered in evaluating the 1970-1980 threat to the United States posed by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other Communist oriented or dominated States will be discussed. Where possible, stress will be placed on the capabilities of potential enemies of the United States to capitalize on their scientific and technological potential to shift the balance of military power.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO  
LECTURES AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

1. The Audience. The audience consists of approximately two hundred and forty persons comprising the faculty and students of the Army War College. This number is composed mainly of colonels and lieutenant colonels of the Army, but also includes a few Navy, Marine, and Air Force officers and several representatives of nonmilitary governmental agencies. All are authorized to receive TOP SECRET information.

2. Question Period. The fifty-minute lecture is normally followed by a question period of twenty to thirty minutes' duration during which students question the lecturer to the extent permitted by the classification of the lecture.

3. Afterlecture Conference. Where time permits, and the lecturer is willing, an informal fifty-minute afterlecture conference is conducted to permit further exchange of views between the lecturer and selected representatives of the various student committees. The groups attending these conferences vary in size from about twenty to forty individuals.

4. Privileged Status of the Speaker's Remarks. Remarks made by the lecturer on the platform are not disseminated outside the College without the express consent of the lecturer in each instance. However, they are used by students in preparing their formal reports.


INCLOSURE

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Kirkpatrick	15 Jan	LBK/m
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
1. - For Information			
2. - To hold for General Carter			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5





Excerpts from Article in Marine Corps Gazette, Entitled "Courage,"  
by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr., USMC

"Moral courage is harder to come by than physical courage."

"Moral courage can be found by those who search for it within themselves."

② General David M. Shoup: "Moral courage -- the courage of our convictions, the guts to stand up and be counted when a matter of principle is involved -- is what it took, in combination with physical courage, to create these free and United States. And courage is what it will require in even greater measure to face the future and maintain our freedom."

③ Abraham Lincoln: "To sin by silence when they should protest makes cowards out of men."

Compton Mackenzie: "Ever since the first World War there has been an inclination to denigrate the heroic aspects of man. We seem to welcome more and more cordially any evidence of weakness in heroes. It is difficult not to suspect that this delight in iconoclasm is the sign of a moral weakness in ourselves, or perhaps it might be nearer the mark to call it moral jealousy."

Compton Mackenzie: "Perhaps the surest test of an individual's moral courage is his refusal to do or say anything to damage his own self-respect."

① Adlai Stevenson: "I doubt if any society in history has faced so great a moral challenge as ours, or needed more desperately to draw on the deepest source of courage and responsibility."

But <sup>we</sup> need only to look at our own society -- the increasing lawlessness, lack of respect for proper authority, the preachings of racism and hatred, the defections of integrity, the "what's in it for me" attitude of so many, to accept as gospel,

1/ Mr. Master of Ceremonies -  
Mr. Toastmaster  
The Oldest Grad  
The Youngest Grad  
All other Grads of  
all The U.S. Academies  
Guests -

AND

That patriarch of  
NORAD and Air/Space,  
That raconteur sans  
égal, that character  
who just assassinated  
me with a fine obituary -

4/ By return cable - JCS  
NORAD it is !!

From that point  
on - no question who  
in charge -

Roy has raised,  
nurtured, wetnursed,  
and reared all 3  
NORAD CIRCUS -

While we're discussing  
ani or  
anuses, or rear ends -  
(and here I'm talking

2/ Roy Rogers Stéman -

auratus arnebus -

P. Prime. Spium - Kidney Stone  
ever since

scruples ?? (CIA?)

Should not come as  
"No Surprise" That  
The Air Marshal was  
in great measure  
responsible for the tag  
NORAD -  
and therein lies a story!

5/ about pieces of  
essential equipment,  
not individuals !!)

Then much effort  
we were able to  
teach Roy to speak  
English - American  
style - to say  
missile, not missyle -  
but only once - he  
always came up with  
"anti-missile-missyle"

3/ 1956 - Study Group -  
ADCANUS - <sup>Canada</sup>  
(air defense Command - US  
CONAD -

1957 - Canucks to  
join -

Barney Oldfield + Roy -  
decided NORAD -

JCS says ADCANUS

Full Confrontation -

Barney + Roy -  
FREE PRESS headlines

ADC ANUS ACTIVATED -

6/ It was not long  
before he was  
calling us all

~~this is his~~

His Purple suited Indians -

NORADIANS - ADCANI

with what we hope  
the same  
was pride and affection  
we held, and hold, for him.

While on the  
subject of Indians,  
I am reminded of

Don't know where  
buried or retired,  
but I know that  
obituary has used  
up my 2 minutes!!

9/ and a compelling obligation that we have as career officers —

Why now?

①

②

③

MacArthur

"There is no substitute for integrity."

(Victory)

8/ As to my message —

I want to take a very few minutes to remind you, and myself even more, of a pride, a privilege,

7/ Irving S. Cobb, hosp. recuperating from an appendicitis operation — He was full of gas, but being a shy, modest person, only ~~remained~~ <sup>had</sup> petulance over his flatulence. One day, etc. etc.

— Fearful in Cap —

— Indian Princess —

12/ End of Sermon (No Diplomat)  
I transit somehow (varied opportunities for career, I suppose) into

State Dept. prime —  
"Two Jokers"  
Then  
to get off restroom  
Norwegian Amb. wife

11/ other occupations.  
Baruch:


"I shall pass this way but once —  
Any good therefore, That I can do, Let me do it now —  
For I shall not pass this way again"

Remember

"There is no substitute for integrity"

10/ By our example at all levels of command, all levels of society, in our ~~deeds~~ <sup>thoughts</sup> and actions every 24 hours, by our motivation, our dedication to duty, our total selflessness, and our leadership, we acquire a deep sense of accomplishment, a total personal satisfaction, not attainable in most

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

*Come fill your glasses fellows...*



## 163rd Anniversary of Founders Day

March 16, 1965 A.D.

## *Program*

1800 - Cocktails

2000 - Mess Call for Dinner

Invocation

Toast to the Commander-in-Chief

Toast to the Corps

Take Seats

Presentation of New Board of Governors

Dinner

2045 - Remarks - Oldest Graduate

Remarks - Youngest Graduate

Address - Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter '31

Football Highlights '64

## *Menu*

Paul Masson Rose Wine

Seafood Cocktail

Prime Rib of Beef Au Jus

Baked Potato - Sour Cream

Green Peas

Tossed Garden Salad

Hot Rolls and Butter

Dessert

Coffee



STAT

[REDACTED]  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

29 March 1965

Dear Pat,

Last evening I bumped into some Fort Carson types who were at the West Point dinner and they, like many others who have spoken about it, were enthusiastic in their feelings about the occasion.

In particular, I believe the comments of one colonel will interest you. I hope he was not just being polite. He said that by virtue of the unusual treatment of your career given by that foreigner who introduced you, he (the colonel) learned with pleasure and will remember your distinguished career more clearly than if it had been recited in the normal fashion. Naturally, I was glad to get this reaction and hope that you are similarly minded (apropos of your comments in your note of 18th March).

The dinner at the Cheyenne Mountain Country Club, which Préot and you so generously hosted, was a thoroughly pleasant occasion. Marion and I much enjoyed ourselves and were glad of the opportunity to meet some of the members of your interesting organization. Thanks for having included us.

Our very best to you both.

*Lincoln*

1-52

Lt. General Marshall S. Carter  
Quarters 14  
Fort McNair  
Washington 25, D. C.

*Noted by DDC*

Colorado Springs, Colorado

STAT

26 March 1965

Dear Pat,

I am later than I would like to be in replying to your kind note of 18th March, having been away on a trip.

It was a great pleasure to have Préot and you in our midst again, although your visit was far too short. The West Point dinner was great fun and I not only thoroughly enjoyed being teamed up with you, but I greatly appreciated the honor of being included in the gathering of West Pointers.

Undoubtedly you have heard from Cal Smith by now, as I have. You may get a chuckle out of the following excerpt from his letter:

".... You and General Carter, as a team, have set a standard which we would hope to attain for future such occasions, but one that can never be surpassed.

"You may be interested in learning that the fellow who had the unmitigated gall to request that your talk stay within a two-minute time goal has been removed from office. As he was leaving town, his last audible comments were, 'Please give me another chance.' 'How was I to know that the Air Marshal never had the slightest intention of ever exceeding by two minutes his established time goal?' Perhaps our measures in this case were a little drastic, but you may rest assured that poor fellow has learned an indelible lesson and will never again bother you with that superfluous admonition, 'two minutes'".

It was good to see you in such good form, Pat, and I hope that our paths cross again, soon.

*Sincerely*  
*Ray*

Lt. General Marshall S. Carter, USA  
Quarters 14  
Fort McNair  
Washington, D. C. 20315

WEST POINT SOCIETY  
OF THE  
PIKES PEAK REGION  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

23 March 1965

Lieutenant General Marshal S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

*Ret.*  
Dear General Carter:

Certainly appreciated your thoughtful note. However, it is you who deserves the thanks for making our Annual Founders' Day Dinner the best yet. You and Roy, as a team, set a standard for future Dinners which we would hope to equal, but can never top.

It was fine seeing you and we are all looking forward to the time when you will be in Colorado Springs on a more permanent basis.

Sincerely,

*F. G. Smith*  
F. G. SMITH  
B/Gen, USA (Ret'd)

*Filed by SSC*

23 March 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20315

Dear Pat,

The consensus of opinion among graduates here is that the recent celebration of Founder's Day was the best ever held in the Colorado Springs area. The principal contribution to this success was your appearance as our guest speaker and we are grateful to you for your inspiring and entertaining remarks.

Also many thanks for your letter enclosing the brochures of CIA. I have turned them over to Mike and Chris, and I know that they will be of much help to them.

Come back and visit us again soon. Libby enjoyed speaking with Preot but was disappointed not seeing you.

Our best to you both.

Sincerely,

D. B. JOHNSON  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Commanding General

13 March 1965

Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon

[REDACTED]

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear A. M.:

It was a delight to be with you last weekend and I must say your "one-upsmanship" is so far ahead of mine that I'm going to have to go back to wearing a cocked hat or some other monstrosity -- certainly I can't even approach that satirical (perhaps it should be spelled "satyrical") wit of yours.

However, I hope everybody understood it was in good, clean fun -- if they didn't, they're too stupid to continue holding their commissions!!

We had a fine trip back and, from our viewpoint, it was a most successful weekend.

Breot joins me in affectionate regards to Marion and you.

Faithfully yours,

*/s/ PNT*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

1 - Speech File

20 March 1965

Colonel Charles R. Broshous  
Director, Expansion Planning and  
Control Office  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York 10996

Dear Russ:

I return herewith, with my thanks, all of the poop you sent me, including the slides. Some of this may belong in the Supe's office but I'll leave all that up to you.

The talk went quite well, according to my spies, even though I did not use anything you sent me. The family did enjoy looking at the slides and reading some of the poop. Anytime you need an Assistant Professor, I am still available even though perhaps unqualified.

Marshall may see you Monday or Tuesday. I think he is up there talking to those first classmen who are interested in joining the Marines.

With my thanks again,

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

1 - Speech File

(material being returned sent separately - both mailed 22 Mar)

*Notes by DWP*

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5  
EXPANSION PLANNING AND CONTROL OFFICE  
HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

4 March 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Quarters 14, Fort McNair  
Washington, D.C. 20315

Dear Pat:

I am certainly pleased that you have found many uses for the slides and the material which I sent you recently. Feel free to keep the slides for your many varied purposes and send back whatever material you no longer wish to keep.

Glad to have been of help in the preparation of your remarks.

Sincerely,



CHARLES R. BROSHOUS  
Colonel, USA  
Director, Expansion Planning  
and Control Office

18 March 1965

Colonel James F. Kirkendall, USAF  
Executive to the Chief of Staff  
Department of the Air Force  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your letter of 6 March and the advices from Secretary Zuckert and J. P.

The arrangements at the Air Force Academy Officers' Mess went off in fine shape and I think everyone enjoyed themselves. Air Marshal Slemon (who introduced me) and I had a lot of fun kidding each other and, so far as I can make out, the assembled multitude went away pleased and with the feeling that they had gotten their money's worth.

I talked a few minutes on integrity and moral courage but, in compliance with J. P.'s request, without adverting directly to cheating either at West Point or the Air Force Academy. I believe all of us can periodically use a reminder on motivation, dedication, integrity, selfless devotion to duty, moral courage, and professionalism, and this is what I covered very briefly. So far as I could make out, my remarks were well received.

With best regards,

Faithfully yours,

*/s/ Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

✓ 1 - Speech File



MEMO

## WP Speech

- ① CONRAD/NORAD/ADCANUS
- ② Two Jokers
- ③ Irving S Cobb —  
petulance over his flatulence  
Indian Princess
- ④ Had not hoped for  
such a favor story —

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

6 March 1965



Lt General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear General Carter:

This is in reply to your telephone call in which you made reference to speaking at the Founders Day dinner on 12 March. I have talked to both Mr. Zuckert and General McConnell with the following results.

Mr. Zuckert asked that I express his appreciation for your thoughtfulness in offering to include points he might want to make. He said, however, that he had no significant points to offer and, in particular, none in connection with the recent cheating episode at the Air Force Academy. He did say he was always interested in people stressing the continuing requirement for professionalism in the military.

General McConnell also wished to thank you for your contact. He said he had nothing specific to offer, but he would prefer that no reference be made to the cheating scandal. (Whether you do or not is, of course, entirely up to you -- his remarks represent, I believe, a normal sensitiveness to the recent unpleasant episode.)

As you may know, the original investigation at the Academy resulted in 105 cadets submitting their resignations. Four additional have submitted resignations as a result of the Honor Committee interviewing alleged tolerators; 30 of 89 football squad members submitted resignations, 16 from other sports. Mr. Zuckert has not taken final action on the resignations as yet and probably will not do so until after the General White Committee submits its report a few weeks from now.

Thank you for your call. Hope you have a pleasant day and evening on the 12th. I know it's always a pleasure to get back to the Colorado Springs area. In turn, the Colorado Springs/Denver area is fortunate in having you speak on such an occasion.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Jim', with a horizontal line underneath.

JAMES F. KIRKENDALL  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Executive to the Chief of Staff

### INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

The calendar year 1964 may well go down in the record books as the most successful ever for Army athletic teams in intercollegiate competition. On the varsity level, Army won 167 of 219 contests, a victory percentage of 77.2. There were also two ties and 50 losses.

Even more important, in 17 meetings with Navy during 1964, the Cadets were victorious in 12, tied one and lost but four. The biggest effort was produced in February when Army won 7 and tied 1 in 8 meetings. Yet, the most important is, and ever will be, the football victory over Navy in Philadelphia last November, when Army won, 11-8, after 5 long years of frustration.

The major level aspect of Army football is apparent again on the 1965 schedule when Army will meet teams from all parts of the nation. The 5 away games include the opener with Tennessee at Knoxville, Notre Dame in New York or Philadelphia, Stanford at Stanford, the Air Force in Chicago and Navy in Philadelphia.

The home program at West Point lists Virginia Military Institute, Boston College, Rutgers, Colgate and Wyoming. The annual Home-coming Game will be on 2 October with Boston College.

Spring football will start this year on Saturday, 3 April, and will end 5 weeks later with the intrasquad game on Saturday night, 8 May. Returning lettermen number 17 -- only 2 more than last year -- again pointing up the lack of depth on the Army grid roster. With the return to "Platoon Football", Coach Paul Dietzel and his staff will utilize two-unit football, 1 on offense and 1 on defense.

The backfield will be the paramount problem this year with all

- 2 -

4 starters graduating. 3 lettermen are back on the offensive unit, but all were limited to reserve roles. Over on the defensive side, only 1 back, Tony Pyrz, was lost, so Army will have cornerbacks Sam Bartholomew and Don Dietz and deep back Ed Noble returning with a season of experience. The quarterback role, so ably handled last fall by Carl Stichweh, could go to Fred Barofsky of LaGrange, Ill, who played quarterback, tailback and fullback last fall as a yearling. Frank Cosentino and Curt Cook are back for their final year, and will dispute Barofsky's bid for the job.

The end spots look strong with five lettermen returning. Sam Champi and Dave Ray were the offensive starters, and Tom Schwartz and Dave Rivers the defensive picks all season. Ed Unruh supported the defensive pair. At tackle, John Carber will be playing in his 3d varsity season and Vince Casillo his 2d. Guards Sonny Stowers and Pete Braun will be in their 3d season as regulars while linebacker Townsend Clarke, one of the best defenders Army has ever had, adds strength to the defensive unit. Barry Nickerson, the place-kicker whose field goal won the Navy game, is also returning this fall.

There appears to be some help coming from the Plebe team of 1964, although the coaches are reserving their opinions until after the spring drills. The post-season analysis showed more depth but not the individual standouts such as Schwartz, Rivers, Clarke, and Barofsky who moved into starting roles in their first varsity game.

The 1964 team, playing one of the toughest schedules in Military Academy history, ended the season with a 4-6 record. Quarterback Stichweh was elected captain and earned all-East and individual honors.

- 3 -

Tackle Bill Zadel was an all-America and all-East pick on several teams, and received the Earl H. Blaik Scholar-Athlete award from the Football Hall of Fame. Stichweh, Zadel, and backs John Seymour, Don Parcells and John Johnson played on the winning North team in the North-South Shrine game Christmas Day in Miami. Since Army and Notre Dame resume competition this year, it was most interesting to note that the co-coaches of the North Team -- Ara Parseghian of Notre Dame and Paul Dietzel of Army -- will be 'across the field' in New York on 9 October.

Coach Eric Tipton, who has been nominated to the Football Hall of Fame for his play while attending Duke University, guided the 150-lb. football team to the intercollegiate title -- the 5th in Tipton's 8 years at West Point. The lightweights won all 6 games, including Navy (6-0) and the finale against Rutgers (46-0). Six players received all-League honors, with guard Chuck Shaw, the team captain, making both the offensive and defensive teams.

The soccer season was almost a carbon copy of 1963. The booters won 10 and lost 3, advancing to the semi-finals of the NCAA Tournament for the 2d straight year, only to lose to Michigan State in overtime 3-2.

On the winter sports scene, Army teams again are headed for successful seasons. The basketball team traveled west over the Christmas holidays, playing in Dayton, Salt Lake City and Portland. Ankle injuries to 3 key players -- center Mike Silliman, forward Bill Helkie and guard Dennis Shantz -- reduced the effectiveness of

- 4 -

the team, but Army managed to finish 4th in the 8-team Far West Classic. The Cadets lost, 65-64, to Oregon State in their tournament opener, but rebounded to register wins over Washington State and Portland. With 14 of the 25 games completed, Army owns a 9-5 record.

Gymnastics is in the rebuilding stages this year with most of the veterans departing via graduation. After 4 meets, the team has a 3-1 record but faces such powerhouses as Penn State, Temple and Navy in February. Coach Tom Maloney continues to be the dean of gymnastic coaches. Last summer he was manager of the United States Olympic Gymnastics team in the games in Japan.

The hockey team won its 1st 8 matches, then lost to Brown as captain Mike Thompson, one of the leading scorers in the East, was sidelined with a back injury. However, Thompson, who hails from Larsmont, Minn., was back in action in late January, teaming with Army's other scoring ace, Bart Barry from Wakefield, Mass., to again make Army a candidate for eastern ice honors.

The pistol team remained one of Army's few unbeaten representatives through the 1st two months of winter action. Out to defend the national intercollegiate title which they won last winter, the Cadet shooters beat the Air Force Academy at West Point in the big January hurdle. Air Force was the lone team to beat Army last year.

Rifle managed to top West Virginia, the only team to score a win over Army last year, in the season opener at West Virginia but St. John's proved too big an obstacle in a match on Long Island in January. Like pistol, the rifle team will close its season with Navy

- 5 -

and Royal Military College, both important matches.

The squash team continues to dominate matches with all but the big 3 -- Princeton, Yale and Harvard. Losses at Harvard and Princeton gave the racquetmen a 3-2 record in mid-January, with the Yale match yet to come.

Swimming also encountered a similar problem, the always powerful Yale team. Although the swimmers made a good showing at Yale, the Eli continue to be the better in that sport. The outstanding performance of Kerry O'Hara, a yearling from Tonawanda, N.Y., in the individual medley promises good fortunes in the water sport for the next few seasons.

Track also has its problem when it comes to indoor meets with Manhattan. The Jaspers won, but again it took the final 2 relay events to decide the outcome. Harvard, rated as the best indoor team in the East, stopped the Cadets in the season opener. But Army came back with victories over Rutgers and a triangular triumph over St. John's and Iona to boast a 2-2 record at mid-season.

Wrestling is the comeback sport of the winter season. While the grapplers finished 1964 with a 2-4-2 record, including a tie with Navy, they won their first five matches this year to stand undefeated at the mid-way mark. Big matches with Penn State, Lehigh and Syracuse and a 4-way affair with Minnesota, Purdue and Illinois in Minneapolis will take place before Army meets Navy at Annapolis.

The spring sports will start the first week in April, and the outlook is most favorable in all 5 activities. Baseball, track and golf will be held at West Point this year on the traditional June Week



- 6 -

sports Saturday.

There continues to be a requirement for a nationwide talent search for candidates who possess the requisite academic ability and leadership but who also possess outstanding athletic attributes. Alumni are requested to let both the Army Athletic Association and the Admissions Division know of young men in their area who express an interest in attending the Military Academy and have the ability to compete on a national caliber team. The competition for outstanding young men continues to grow and athletic recruiting by all institutions (large and small) is becoming more intense.

There is a need to further disseminate information on West Point education and training and to dispel misconceptions. The problem is getting the word to the field, contacting the young men in areas throughout the country and making certain that these young men take the steps required to gain entrance. Your effort is needed to seek out, motivate and assist these young men in obtaining appointments to West Point.

18 March 1965

Lt. Colonel George S. Pappas  
Deputy Chief, O & T Division, G3  
Hqs., U. S. Army Air Defense Command  
Ent Air Force Base  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear George:

Just a line to thank you again for all of your support and many courtesies during our recent trip to Colorado Springs, and especially for writing my talk for me.

I have read the book that Pat gave to Preet and have found it acceptable for Preet to read so she is now engaged in it. I enjoyed it myself immensely -- not too many big words!!

I was happy to find Pat and you in such good health and spirits and, I say again, many thanks for all of your help.

Preet joins me in affectionate regards,

Faithfully yours,

*/s/ MSC*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

✓ 1 - Speech File



Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND  
ENT AIR FORCE BASE  
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 80912

ADGCD

1 March 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Chief  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear Boss:

Enclosed, in my own fine style of typing<sup>(?)</sup>, is a draft of the remarks for your talk on Founders' Day. I hope that this follows the guide lines you gave me.

This is short --- I am off to Bliss in a matter of minutes.

Pat joins me in sending our best to Preot.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Pappas", is written over the typed name "GEORGE S. PAPPAS".

GEORGE S. PAPPAS  
Lt Colonel, GS  
Deputy Chief, O&T Div, G3

1 Incl  
as

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

ADGCD

1 March 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Chief  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear Boss:

Enclosed, in my own fine style of typing, is a draft of the remarks for your talk on Founders' Day. I hope that this follows the guide lines you gave me.

This is short --- I am off to Bliss in a matter of minutes.

Pat joins me in sending our best to Preot.

Sincerely,

1 Incl  
as

GEORGE S. PAPPAS  
Lt Colonel, GS  
Deputy Chief, O&T Div, G3

DRAFT REMARKS FOR FOUNDERS DAY BY LT GEN M.S. CARTER

(To follow informal comments made after introduction to assembled graduates)

Gentlemen, the individual who is unfortunate enough to be the honored guest usually draws upon his memory of cadet days, tells a few stories, and possibly tells his fellow <sup>graduates</sup> audience either of his own work or the changes now being made to our Alma Mater. My recollections of my own cadet days probably differ little from your own and are of interest <sup>to me</sup> to only ~~ourselves~~. My stories--particularly when told in mixed company of the Navy and Air Force--are not too funny. I doubt if I can tell you much of my business of killing spies for James Bond seems to do a better job of that than I could ever hope to do. And I know no more about the improvements being made at West Point than you, probably less since the <sup>com</sup> ~~Sup~~ briefed you thoroughly a year ago.

It may well be that I am about to upset the apple cart of tradition and shock some of you for I have a message. This is not being done in a spirit of fun. I am deliberately taking advantage of the fact that I have a captive audience of professionals, professional military men regardless of the color of the uniform you wear. I am going to talk to you about the basic foundation of our officer corps: integrity and professional ethics.

I have become increasingly disturbed in recent months by comments I have heard from fellow officers of all ranks about the lack of integrity and the seeming non-existence of professional ethics in the officers of all services--non-graduates and, most unfortunately, graduates alike. If this be true, if the comments I have heard are based upon fact, then the very foundation upon which our American professional military service is built is ~~in danger of~~ serious danger, ~~if not utter destruction~~. Let me give you some examples.

A young Air Force officer, a non-graduate, told me that the flying school he went to <sup>had</sup> an honor system based upon that of West Point: a flying cadet did not cheat, lie or steal and did not condone these in others. He said this was important after he graduated because, if his wing man was supposed to be covering his wing--his flank to us ground pounders--he knew that he could trust that man to be there. Now, this officer continued, that there was no combat situation involved, he felt that the honor code which he was taught in flying school was unessential. I asked him what he meant. His reply was an example: a friend

hit the bottle a bit heavy and failed to show for work, not once but many times. He was never reported because his fellow officers covered for him by one story or another when their superior asked where the individual was. To the officer who told me this story, doing anything other than shielding the man would have been "squealing" or ratting. I ask you: is this professional integrity?

All of the services use a form of the efficiency report. And all of the services are concerned about the inflated ratings being given. There seems to be undue effort, almost deliberate effort, to make certain that an officer being rated is rated so high as to be a "water walker." It is true that many officers are outstanding, that more are superior. But the percentages falling in these two categories are so high as to almost make numerical ratings completely invalid. It is true that efficiency reports are extremely important to the individual, that these are the basis for promotion and the means of selection for the senior service schools. In the case of our reserve officers on active duty, efficiency reports mean the difference between continuing on duty or returning to civil life. But more important than effect upon the individual's career is the result these reports have upon the Army, upon all services, in the future. These reports have a profound influence upon the policy, the doctrine, the very existence of our armed forces and even the fate of the nation for these pieces of paper may well determine who will be Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, <sup>heads</sup> ~~commanders~~ of major commands in peace or in war. And these men will guide the destiny of their commands. Does not the rating officer have an obligation to the Army? as well as to the man he rates? Is not integrity involved? Should not the best interests of the service come before the interest of the individual?

The exact opposite is also true. Officers are sometimes rated upon scores made in various tests and evaluations and upon nothing else. And, in this game of points, good officers who would be of distinct benefit to the service in the future are penalized for a one-shot result. This is almost like the coach jerking a quarterback who fumbled the ball after driving seventy yards--completely ignoring the fact that a guard failed to stop the opposition lineman from hitting the quarterback. Here again the best interests of the service are being ignored and also the well-being of the individual officer. Are not professional ethics involved?

What a few years ago would have been completely unacceptable has almost become a way of life in some circles. I refer to the "leak" of information-- passing out the peop to newspapermen or even to Members of the Congress. This is done and done often. How do you suppose columnists get confidential data on a conference or even highly classified information? It is given to them, often for a cash return. On the other hand, such data is sometimes deliberately leaked ~~in~~ in an effort to achieve a certain<sup>15</sup> goal. Is this ethical? ~~But~~ an officer who provides information~~in~~, whether for personal gain or not, displaying professional integrity? And yet this happens, ~~and happens often.~~

*Insert after last paragraph page 2*

One of my former commanders once said that junior field grade officers--the action officers on every staff--were the men who established policy, the men who originated ideas and then sold them to their seniors. Let me tell you what one of these young officers encountered recently. This man uncovered some facts which indicated a certain policy of his command was in serious danger of being eliminated by outside direction. He did what he had been taught at Leavenworth, reported this to his immediate superior and recommended a staff study to present the full picture to the commanding general. The superior agreed. So the young officer made the staff study, a lengthy one, which in due course went to his section chief with a recommendation to brief the commander. The chief agreed that the briefing be scheduled but--and here is the point in this example--directed that the facts, and these were cold hard facts, ~~directed~~ that ~~the facts~~ be warped to provide only one conclusion. In essence, truth was being withheld from the commander. Is this an example of presenting both sides of an item being discussed with a recommendation or recommendation being based upon logical conclusions? What was the effect of this section chief's action on the action officer? What happened to professional ethics?

The recent Department of Defense edict against accepting gratuities and entertainment from contractors was blasted from all sides. Comments were made that an officer would more likely sell his ~~suit~~ soul to the devil as to sell a contract for dinner! There is more to this decision than just dinners or drinks or ball point pens or tie clips. Industry being what industry is, what can be termed only as bribes have been and are being offered in the hopes of getting a big contract. And there are examples of this. Is the officer who accepts such fulfilling his duties? Where is his integrity? What became of his ethics?

There are many little examples: the company or battery commander who loads a truck with surplus material the day the IG is to arrive; the commander who makes a false report on equipment readiness; the inspector who does not report a deficiency because it will hurt the commander who is a friend; the officer who flies 250 miles on Saturday to see his girl without leave; the man who takes off hours before a fellow officer signs him out. Are these examples of professional integrity?



Gentlemen, all of these examples are only little things. Not one of them has a direct and profound effect upon the future of the services--not by themselves. But added together these small examples point out one thing: a lack of integrity and professional ethics in the officer corps. Each of these actions by an officer ~~xxx~~ makes an impression upon other officers, upon juniors, equals and in some cases superiors. And all too often the impression made results in the same thing being done by others, a chain reaction if you will. This is the danger: a spread of indifference to honor and integrity, a deterioration of our professional ethics.

You and I have an advantage not given to many others. We were raised in an environment which respected the right of the individual but at the same time stressed the best interests of the service. We were taught that a man's word was his bond; that an officer's signature verified the truth of all that appeared above that signature; that honor came before friendship and duty before honor. We were taught to present facts, not theories or ~~wrapped~~ <sup>semi-</sup> facts based upon personal desires, and to make recommendations based <sup>only</sup> upon ~~these~~ facts. You and I know that honor is as much a part of the good leader as courage; that integrity is as essential as physical stamina; that ethics are an important professional characteristic of our work. And I ask if you and I are doing our utmost to give the benefits of what we were taught--no rather, what became a part of each of us as cadets and midshipmen--are we passing this to our fellow officers?

A very great soldier, Douglas MacArthur said these words:

"Duty-Honor-Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points; to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn. .... The unbelievers will say that they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

"But these are some of the things they do. They build your basic character; they mold you for your future roles as custodians of the nation's defense; they make you strong enough to know <sup>when</sup> ~~you~~ you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself

when you are afraid. They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success, not to substitute words for actions, not to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress~~es~~ and ~~the~~ spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm but to have compassion on those who fail; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clean, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh yet ~~xxxxxxx~~ never forget how to weep; to reach into the future yet never neglect the past; to be serious yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength. They give you a temper of the will, a quality of imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity; an appetite for adventure over a life of ease. They create in your heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life. They teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman.

.....

*destiny* "You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation's in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds. The Long Gray Line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses thundering those magic words--Duty-Honor-Country."

*the* Gentlemen, I can add only ~~that underlying these profound words are the~~ charge that upon you and me lies the <sup>task</sup> ~~work~~ of maintaining the integrity and ethics of our profession, the integrity fostered and preserved by MacArthur and Marshall, by Arnold and Vandenberg, by Nimitz and Halsey. This is the badge which sets the professional military man apart from his civilian contemporaries; this is <sup>what makes</sup> ~~the basis upon which~~ our profession ~~becomes~~ truly a profession. We must set the example and lead the way for our fellow officers. To paraphrase another statement by General MacArthur, "There is no substitute for integrity."

18 March 1965

Air Marshal C. Roy Siemon

[Redacted]

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear A. M.:

It was a delight to be with you last weekend and I must say your "one-upsmanship" is so far ahead of mine that I'm going to have to go back to wearing a cocked hat or some other monstrosity -- certainly I can't even approach that satirical (perhaps it should be spelled "satyrical") wit of yours.

However, I hope everybody understood it was in good, clean fun -- if they didn't, they're too stupid to continue holding their commissions!!

We had a fine trip back and, from our viewpoint, it was a most successful weekend.

Preet joins me in affectionate regards to Marion and you.

Faithfully yours,

*Ms/ Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

✓ 1 - Speech File

18 March 1965

Major General Robert H. Warren, USAF  
Superintendent  
United States Air Force Academy  
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80840

Dear Bob:

Just a note to report that the arrangements at the Air Force Academy Officers' Mess for the West Point Founders' Day Dinner went off in fine shape and I think everyone enjoyed themselves.

Air Marshal Siemon and I had a lot of fun kidding each other and, so far as I can make out, the assembled multitude went away pleased and with the feeling that they had gotten their money's worth.

I talked a few minutes on integrity and moral courage but without adverting directly to cheating either at West Point or the Air Force Academy. So far as I could make out, my remarks were well received. I had previously received a request from J. P. McConnell suggesting that I not talk about cheating and I of course acceded. However, all of us can periodically use a reminder on motivation, dedication, integrity, selfless devotion to duty, moral courage, and professionalism, and this is what I covered very briefly.

Best regards to all,

Faithfully yours,

*As Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

1 - Speech File

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY  
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
COLORADO 80840

1 March 1965

Lt General Marshall S. Carter  
Quarters 14, Fort McNair  
Washington, D. C. 20315

Dear General Carter:

Thanks for your letter of 26 February. My face is quite red over the Founders' Day Dinner -- earlier I had my wife work out a date when we could host a dinner party for General Gerhart and the Gerharts picked Friday, 12 March -- hence we are committed and I can't be with you at the Founders' Day Dinner.


I think most of the 500 graduates in the area will be there and it certainly is an impressive and influential group since there are graduates that go back to the Class of 1910.

I think your proposed speaking subjects would be most interesting and appropriate. I spoke at Wright-Patterson last year and found a very responsive audience which appreciated any humor in the remarks--therefore, I kept mine in a fairly light vein.

As to your discussing the Honor Code and our recent problem out here, I think it would be most appropriate before this particular group. They all lived under the Honor Code and understand it and its problems. Many civilians don't. In view of their interest and yours in the cheating problem and the merits of the Honor System, I would be delighted to have you discuss this subject here at the Academy Club. It would cause me no problem -- I rather hope our problems are over and behind us since we have closed out the investigation and the subsequent Honor Committee actions.

I look forward to seeing you during your visit here and regret that circumstances make it impossible for me to attend the Founders' Day Dinner.

Sincerely,

  
ROBERT H. WARREN  
Major General, USAF  
Superintendent

17 March 1965

Brigadier General F. G. Smith  
President, West Point Society  
Pikes Peak Region

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Cal:

Just a note to thank you again for letting me come to Colorado Springs and putting on a small floor show with Roy Slemmon. I hope we gave you your money's worth -- I must say being half of a vaudeville show with Roy on the other end of the horse is a tough assignment!!

Hope things continue to look up for you -- you have my admiration and great respect.

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - West Point File

✓ 1 - Speech File

27 February 1965

Colonel F. T. Folk

Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

Dear Buck:

Many thanks for yours of the 22nd. You say you don't have an original thought and then you give me two original thoughts --who is doing your thinking for you?

Preet and I were most appreciative of your thought in taking Stoney as your daughter for the Rotary Club meeting and were delighted to hear of your fine report on her. Many, many thanks.

See you in a couple of weeks, and, in the meantime, Preet joins me in affectionate regards to Herron and you.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:bec

Orig - Adse

1 - Alpha "F"

1 - Speech file

1 - West Point File

F. T. Folk

Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

22 Feb.

Dear Pat,

I don't have an original thought. Your audience will be composed of over 60% of graduates since WW II. After all the drinking and preliminaries- a talk of 20 minutes would be adequate, with this I agree. My related thoughts the last few weeks have harked back frequently to: 1) what's our State Dept. doing wrong that gets us in fixes such as Kore - and now Vietnam. And then they say the Military brings these situations about. 2) Re Air Academy scandal, is this typical of what to expect in the future because of a lowering of honor and integrity among our current teenagers. Or are we still rearing good youngsters- as good as before. Lots of material in these two areas but perhaps too political.

Stoney was my daughter at Daughter's Day at our Rotary Club meeting Feb. 11th. We caught up on lots of things. One fine girl! We both work in the same building now.

Best from the west,

*Buck*



26 February 1965

Major General Robert H. Warren  
Superintendent  
United States Air Force Academy  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Bob:

As you may have heard, I have accepted an invitation to talk at the West Point Founders' Day Dinner at the Air Force Academy Officers' Club on the evening of Friday, 12 March.

Remarks on an occasion like this must of course be geared to the atmosphere at the time and the tempo of the participants. I think you know me well enough to know that I will try to do whatever is right and want to be helpful.

If it seems appropriate at the time, I intend to cover very shortly and briefly, in a totally informal and perhaps humorous vein, some of the things that have happened to me in my career which have clearly indicated the tremendous advantages of a military career and the tremendous personal satisfaction one acquires from the motivation, dedication, and selfless devotion to duty that is required of a career officer in any of the services. (Believe me, I would not try to hold myself up as an example, but would utilize the third-person approach.

I also intend to cover, in connection with the same theme, what I presume is a steal of General MacArthur's statement but which is even more compelling to me than his, and it would be "There is no substitute for integrity." This

- 2 -

would all be done in a totally positive vein and would, I hope, support fully and totally (without specific reference, of course) the attitudes of the Military Academy and the Air Force Academy in the problems of 1951 and the present, respectively.

Would any of this give you any problem of any kind? Or if you would prefer me to take some other line entirely, just let me know. I'm not asking for clearance for my remarks, nor would anybody be involved in any way except myself. I just want to be constructive.

I do not plan on talking more than ten or twelve minutes and have not yet prepared even an outline of my talk except what you have read above. Lt. Colonel George Pappas at ARADCOM has volunteered to send me some ideas also since he tells me he is connected with the program. I also mentioned this to Butch Blanchard and Jim Kirkendall in the Pentagon and asked them if I could be of any help at this time. I have not, however, heard from either and see no point in needling them.

With my continued admiration, especially for the manner in which you are handling your present problem.

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

✓ 1 - DDCI Speech File

1 - West Point File

26 February 1965

Major General J. B. Lampert  
Superintendent  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York 10996

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for sending me the information sheets on the Academy and also for asking [ ] to augment them with additional information. I am now well healed with up-to-date poop which I am sure will be useful in preparing my remarks.

25X1

I am in complete agreement, naturally I hope, with your comments about the honor code. I will probably touch on that but much of course depends on the atmosphere at the dinner and how the program is conducted.

In any event, many thanks for all the help.

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

✓ 1 - DDCI Speech File w/basic

1 - DDCI ~~XXXX~~ West Point File

WEST POINT SOCIETY  
OF THE  
PIKES PEAK REGION  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

26 February 1965

Lieutenant General Marshal S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Pat:

We are all delighted that your plans to be with us on 12 March are still firm. We hope they will continue with the firmness indicated in your other than official and recreational activities! Incidentally, I tried some of that ginseng root while in Korea and found its proclaimed attributes to be rather disappointing.

Your plans for an informal, brief type of address are fine. Am sure the group would like to hear, within the bounds of security, any highlights on current activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any interesting facets of the Washington merry-go-round, plus how to get a coon's tail.

Final count on the number expected at the dinner is not yet in. However, there should be 350 to 400, made up of graduates from the USMA, the Naval and Air Academies and half a dozen from foreign service academies, who are on the faculty at the Air Academy. There will be a fellow by the name of Slemon who will introduce you. I have asked that he try and hold all accolades, etc., in your behalf to two minutes. Know this is like asking for the time of flight on the Mars space probe to be suddenly cut in half. Tentatively, at the head table, will be all local major commanders, Gen Ben Chidlaw, Air Marshal Slemon, Maj Gen Tom Finley, yours truly, and the old grad. This lineup is subject to change as Bob Warren has scheduled a farewell dinner for John Gerhart the same night. Nonetheless, in your class, you should see such notables as Charlie Duff, Merv Magee and Bo Bowman.

If there are any details I can take care of at this end of the line in the way of transportation, etc., will be glad

to do so. Also, will be happy to arrange for an aide.

With fond regards.

Sincerely,



F. G. SMITH  
B/Gen, USA (Ret)  
President, West Point Society  
Pikes Peak Region  
205 Cypress Lane  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

P.S. Understand that George Pappas is working up some notes for your talk, and the theme on which he is working sounds fine.

20 February 1965

Brigadier General F. G. Smith  
President, West Point Society  
Pikes Peak Region  
[REDACTED]

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Cal:

My plans to talk at the Founders' Day Dinner are still holding firm but I thought you should be alerted to the possibility that at the last moment something can always come up to interfere. As you probably know, Mr. McCone and I are the only two statutory appointees in the Central Intelligence Agency and under current ground rules one of us must be immediately available at all times. This plays hell with my recreational activities but thus far has not interfered with my sex life!!

I plan to leave here on the morning of the 11th and stop off at Independence to give my periodic briefing to President Truman which I do every month or so at President Johnson's direction. I will then come in and stay at the Broadmoor Thursday afternoon. If things are real quiet, I may stay over until Sunday morning -- or if there is a crunch on here, I may have to leave Saturday morning. Unless we are in the midst of a real crisis (and we seem to either have them periodically or generate them in Washington) or unless Mr. McCone is for official reasons called away from Washington, I will be with you. I did think it necessary to tell you of the risk, however, in the event you want to line up a substitute from local and much more qualified talent.

- 2 -

Incidentally, I intend to speak most informally and quite briefly unless you have something else in mind and can tell me about it in a letter!!

Hope to see you soon.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

✓ 1 - DDCI (Speech File)

1 - West Point File

26 February 1965

Colonel Charles R. Broshous  
Director, Expansion Planning and Control Office  
Hqs., United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York 10996

Dear Russ:

Many thanks for sending me all the poop about the Academy -- I'm sure it will be of considerable help in preparing my remarks and I hope I can get around to getting enough time to prepare my remarks before I make my remarks!! In any event, I shall keep it all until after I have made my remarks and then send back what I don't need to keep on a permanent basis. Unless you get real mean, however, I would certainly like to keep the slides since I can have many uses for them both publicly and privately.

Marshall had told me of his desire to return to West Point as an instructor and the fact that he had corresponded with you on it. I don't have to tell you of my pride in him and my sure knowledge that he would do a fine job. As you point out, however, this is a fairly difficult assignment for a Marine to arrange and I assume that the Academy now requires advanced degrees before signing up an instructor -- I don't know much about whether the Marine Corps likes to have its fighting types also be Ph. D. 's!! In any event, I know Marshall would do a crackerjack job for you.

All goes well here at the pickle factory. I must say this job is more demanding than any I have ever had, more frustrating, but also more exciting -- I still think I should



- 2 -

have been made Professor of Natural and Experimental  
Philosophy some ten or twenty years ago when I was wetting  
myself to get the job!!

Many thanks again, and warmest regards to Barbara  
and you from us both.

Faithfully yours,

MS/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC: blp  
Original - Addressee  
✓ - DDCI Speech File  
1 - West Point File

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

18 February 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C., 20505

Dear Pat:

Jim Lampert, in his recent letter to you reference your speech at the Air Force Academy USMA Founders Day Dinner, stated I would send you information and slides I have assembled in connection with the USMA expansion program. Inclosed is considerable material which I know is more than you need, but should give you a variety from which to choose. The packet includes a copy of the Appendix of Report of the Superintendent, dated 1 January 1963, mimeographed descriptive material dated 1 March 1964 keyed to the Appendix, and a brief descriptive brochure of the new Library. This will give you a comprehensive description of the Academy Expansion Plan as submitted by USMA to the Department of Army in January 1963.

In addition, there are inclosed fifteen slides indicating the latest expansion developments. The text that follows is keyed to the slides by number. This text is not intended to be in a form for formal presentation but is merely background material to assist you in the preparation of your speech.

Finally, in addition to the standard material I have assembled and have been sending out in response to many requests, I have inclosed a special set with a little descriptive material which might be useful and of added interest. I have long remembered the several favors you have given me, especially assistance in getting Rusty quickly back to West Point from Colorado Springs. I appreciate the opportunity to reciprocate.

Feel free to retain any of this material you may wish to keep. Should you not desire to retain any or all of it, I would appreciate your sending it back. We can always use it for other speeches and presentations.

Rusty announced his engagement about a month ago; he plans to be married in June. At present, he is at Princeton for a two-year tour getting his Masters in Civil Engineering and Public Affairs. It is a wonderful opportunity.


MAEP

18 February 1965

Heard from young Marshall not too long ago, asking about returning to West Point as an instructor in my department. I told him we definitely would like to have him and would put him on our list and initiate action to get the Marines to assign him to us. In the past I have tried in two cases to get a Marine in our Department but, so far, no luck. I hope we do better in Marshall's case.

Barbara joins me in sending our very best to you and Preot.

Sincerely,



CHARLES R. BROSHOUS  
Colonel, USA  
Director, Expansion Planning and  
Control Office

*Noted by DDCL*

MACS

15 February 1965

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Pat:

I hope you will pardon my delay in replying to your letter of 3 February. It was held until my return today from a short but most enjoyable leave.

I am happy to know that you will be the speaker at the Air Force Academy Founders Day Dinner and am sure that your message to them will be a most stimulating and enjoyable one. To assist as you requested, I am inclosing advance copies of the material which is being prepared for use at similar dinners throughout the world.

With respect to discussing the importance of integrity, I fully agree. You will already, I am sure, have considered the best avenue. In their present troubles, we have confined ourselves to several expressions of strong support for what they are doing to maintain a strong honor code which belongs to and is jealously protected by the cadets.

I hope the material I am sending may be of use. If there is any further assistance we can render, please let me know.

Gerrie joins me in sending all good wishes to Preot and you.

Sincerely,

Incls  
as

J. B. LAMPERT  
Major General, USA  
Superintendent

3 February 1965

Major General J. B. Lampert  
Superintendent  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York 10996

Dear Jim:

I have accepted an invitation to talk informally at the Officers Club at the Air Force Academy on the evening of 12 March for the USMA Founders Day Dinner. I am not sure what they are looking for from me but I would imagine something between Charles Evans Hughes and Bob Hope.

I would contemplate talking not over 10 or 15 minutes at the outside and would want to keep it light and airy. That part of it I can handle myself. However, it occurs to me that you or your PIO might have some special message you think it appropriate to get across, and, if so, I would much appreciate the line you would want me to take. \* I would be talking to graduates of the two Academies, both active duty and retired, and it occurred to me that I might remind them exactly what our honor systems mean, especially when you consider that we are career public servants serving all our lives under the Articles of War and that while MacArthur said, "There is no substitute for victory," we should bear in mind in raising and training our young officers for military command and staff duties, "There is no substitute for integrity."

(Handwritten note: \* "non-attributable of course -- whatever came out would be pure Carter."

Anything you can do to help would certainly pleasure  
me.

Preet joins me in affectionate regards to Gerrie and  
you.

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:bec

Orig - Adse

✓ 1 - DDCI files (Search File)

1 - West Point File

64-7769/A

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

24 November 1964

Brig. General F. G. Smith  
President, West Point Society  
Pikes Peak Region

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Col:

Thanks for your confirming letter of 19 November  
reference my talking to the Founders' Day Dinner at  
the Air Academy on 12 March 1965.

I look forward with high anticipation to this event  
and certainly hope that I am still gainfully employed at  
that time -- I haven't the slightest idea what I will talk  
about but you can be assured that it will be short, light,  
and perhaps have some traces of humor.

I will probably combine this event with some other  
official requirements in the mid-West and West but I'll  
be in touch with you later about all this.

Hope all goes well with you and yours.

Faithfully yours,

*Pat*

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

MSC:blp

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

✓ 1 - DDCI (*Spurk File*)

WEST POINT SOCIETY  
OF THE PIKES PEAK REGION  
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

19 November 1964

Lt General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Pat:


It was fine talking to you last week. Am sure you were surprised to be getting a call from me and greatly relieved to find out the purpose was not to dun you for a small loan.

To confirm our telephone conversation of 10 November, on behalf of the West Point Society, Pikes Peak Region, I extend a warm invitation to be our guest speaker at the Founders' Day Dinner, 12 March 1965. It will be held at the Air Academy Officers' Mess at approximately 1800 hours. I will forward details when they become firm. For your planning purposes, we hope to have some 300 graduates present, including a few from the Naval Academy and possibly a very small number of graduates from the Air Academy and the Royal Military College. Although the Air Academy will be hosting the dinner, I am going to try to hold the Old Grad and Young Grad to two minutes each. As a rough guideline, you might shoot for about thirty minutes; however, please feel perfectly free to use any length of time you wish. As for a subject, I hardly know what to suggest for one of your varied experiences, renowned wit, and oratorical ability. Actually, Pat, I know that anything you decide to cover will be enthusiastically received.

You have a host of friends here who will be wanting to take you in tow on your arrival next March. However, I will be ready to make any arrangements you require in the way of transportation, accommodations, aides, etc. In the meantime, we are delighted that you can be on hand for our Annual Founders' Day Dinner. Hope no unforeseen events will preclude your coming.

With fond regards,

Sincerely,

  
F. G. SMITH  
Brigadier General, USA, Ret.  
President, West Point Society,  
Pikes Peak Region




SUSPENSE: Indefinite

General Cal Smith of NORAD called General Carter on 10 November to say that they were planning the West Point Founder's Day Dinner on Friday 12, or Friday 19 March, and they would like very much to have General Carter as the speaker. General Carter told them as far as he knows now "if he is still gainfully employed" he will be delighted to do so. General Smith said they would like to have him speak for about 15 minutes on any subject he chose -- said the Air Academy is hosting this year and the Navy will also be participating so it would be a mixed group.

General Smith will write General Carter all the particulars.

Bernie



REMARKS FOR 67 INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL MILITARY ATTACHES

AND FIVE DIS FACULTY OFFICERS

CIA AUDITORIUM; 0830, 9 MARCH '65

(Ten-minute introductory remarks)

- I. Welcome to CIA.
- II. During your time with us, you will be covering in some detail various aspects of the work we do here at CIA.
  - A. Program today is geared primarily to the work we do in the Agency's Directorate for Intelligence -- the component responsible for finished, all-source intelligence analysis and production. This includes the daily and weekly reports, estimates, and special memos and studies.
  - B. Program has this emphasis because we want you to know of the important role you will have in your posts abroad. Finished intelligence prepared at the Washington level will lean heavily on information received from American country teams and you will be important members of the country team. Intelligence is essentially a service -- an essential one -- to policy makers.
- III. You will later be learning of the work being done in our Directorate for Plans -- the component responsible for clandestine operations. This is important because of the kind of working relationships you will have with our CIA stations overseas.
  - A. This working relationship will be a close one. We hope and expect that they will be harmonious. There is plenty of work and glory for all.
  - B. As you know, <sup>covert</sup> intelligence collection operations abroad are subject to the coordinating approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. Coordination of these matters abroad is the responsibility of the CIA Station Chief, who is the personal representative of the Director.
  - C. Duplication versus gaps.

- IV. While I'm on the subject of intelligence collection operations and clandestine activities, I also want to point out something that you will discover to be true, if you do not know now. That is:
- A. The CIA, despite charges to the contrary does not carry out unilateral operations nor make U.S. foreign policy on its own.
  - B. Our operations are subject to and carried out with the approval of the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and often by all three of these agencies.
  - C. Operations abroad are carried out with the knowledge of the Ambassador in the country concerned.
  - D. In the final analysis, most of our operations are planned and based on recommendations of the Ambassador and the Country Team. This again reflects the importance of the jobs to which you are about to be assigned.
- V. My time has run its course. It's been a pleasure for me to have talked with you. Best wishes to all of you in the important work that lies ahead.
- A. You will find us in the Agency ready and willing to cooperate with you as members of a team.

8 March 1965

General ~~Curry~~ Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Attached are remarks for your 10-minute welcoming address to the DIS students at ~~0830~~ tomorrow, 9 March.  
/0900

I had discussed with you the rather odd looking program and looked into the background for this. It turns out that the subjects were selected specifically by the DIS staff as ones most fitting for tomorrow's briefings. It seems that in the past, the DIS staff and students have been somewhat disappointed by the briefings given by higher level types such as Dick Helms and Ray Cline, who are said to "talk down" to the students.

It is planned, however, that the students will return at a later time *this week* for 2 or 3 days worth of sessions with CIA officers, including DDP officers. They will meet with CIA officers concerned with the areas to which they will be assigned and in the course of these 2 or 3 days will learn more about the Clandestine Services.

*Wm*  
HK

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

*Speech File*

The following five DIS faculty  
representatives will accompany the class  
on 9 March 1965.

Col. Robert Robens, USA  
Lt. Col. Jerome Lowe, USAF  
Lt. Col. Eugene Benoit, USAF  
Lt. Cdr. Angelo P. Semeraro, USN  
Lt. Cdr. James R. Bachtold, USN

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

OFFICIAL USE  
ONLY

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL  
ATTACHE CLASS 2-65

program

9 MARCH 1965

OFFICIAL USE  
ONLY





THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
EXTENDS A MOST CORDIAL WELCOME  
TO THE STUDENTS, STAFF AND FACULTY  
ATTACHE CLASS 2-65  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL  
PROGRAM**

**AUDITORIUM**

**Tuesday, 9 March 1965**

0845	Arrival and Entrance Processing .....	Auditorium Lobby
0900 - 0915	Welcome ..... Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, USA <i>Deputy Director</i>	STAT
0920 - 1000	Specialized Reference Support for Intelligence ..... <i>Executive Assistant, Central Reference</i>	<input type="text"/>
1000 - 1020	Coffee .....	Auditorium Terrace
1020 - 1100	Biographic Support for Intelligence ..... <i>Biographic Register</i>	<input type="text"/> STAT

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

\*Individual briefings are separately scheduled for 9, 10, 11, 16 and 17 March.

STAT  
STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



General Carter:

Attached are notes for remarks at the Midcareer Course this afternoon. <sup>★</sup> Your remarks will close the current course. You used the same notes last year and I think they are still valid.

You might also want to consider some of the following suggestions:

1. Red White thinks it would be helpful for you to make something of the point that none of the students should consider the course <sup>NO</sup> any substitute for the five-year career plan that we have launched. It is difficult for each of the career services to plan for each and every individual but we are trying, and much of the initiative for this planning should come from the individual himself. The students should take this initiative, build on what they have learned, and work with their career services in trying to develop the best possible plan for their careers.

2. [ ] who is the Course's case officer, suggests you might want to raise morale a bit by saying that the current administration's slow-down on promotions does not foreclose all possibilities -- promotions will be tougher and economy waves tighter, but onward and upward.

17 yr.  
48.

3. [ ] says these students have just returned from visits to space centers at Huntsville and Houston and have had their heads in clouds with missilery, man-to-the-moon, and expenditures in terms of billions of dollars. Anything you can say to bring them down to earth and fasten their eyes on the CIA road ahead would be helpful. We have no unlimited treasury such as the space effort appears to have. We confront many of the same old problems, and within the limits of our budget and our resources must continue to get our hands dirty with solid, hard work.

HK

(19 February 1965)

★ Filed w/ material for Midcareer Course  
of 17 Sept 64

SUSPENSE: 15 February

Mr. Baird's office was advised that General Carter would deliver the closing address and pass out the graduation certificates, and that the General would go to Broyhill to do this.

                     to draft speech for General  
Carter to use.

BLP

STAT

DTR 2516

DD/S 64-6255

Executive Registry

64-8162

8 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Participation by DCI and DDCI in Midcareer  
Course No. 5

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; this action is contained in Paragraph 3.

2. We are hopeful that both Mr. McCone and General Carter can participate in the forthcoming Midcareer Executive Development Course.

3. We would like to have the Director deliver a fifteen to twenty minute address during the opening session of the Course, and to have General Carter make the closing address and present graduation certificates on the final day. We would be equally pleased, of course, to have the order of appearance reversed.

4. The initial session of the Course is scheduled to be held on Wednesday, 6 January 1965, in Room 7D64 Headquarters Building. The talk by the DCI or the DDCI is planned for 1330 hours. However, it can be arranged for any time between 1330 and 1530 hours. The address might be in the nature of a welcome to the members of Midcareer Executive Development Course No. 5 and might include observations concerning the value to the Agency of the Course and of the Midcareer Training Program. The talk might touch upon the need for managerial know-how, for the highest standards of professionalism in all aspects of the Agency's endeavors, and for increased awareness of the problems and opportunities facing the U.S. Government both at home and abroad.

SECRET  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**MATTHEW BAIRD**  
**Director of Training**

**Deputy Director for Support**

Date \_\_\_\_\_

- O - Addressee (Return to DTR)  
1 - ER  
2 - DD/S  
2 - DTR  
2 - MSOC/TR (1 w/held)





MEMORANDUM FOR: The Board  
Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

General Carter was to have delivered the opening address to Project [ ] at 0900 on 9 February 1965, but had to cancel out. Instead, he delivered the closing address at 4:15 on 10 February. (Mr. McCone was originally to have delivered the closing address but had to cancel out.)

STAT

BLP

(DATE)

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

*Speech file*

For Project

*10 Feb '65*

STAT

- I. Will not spend a great deal of time on what the Agency does and how it is organized. The speakers who have preceded me have covered this ground.
- II. We hope this program, as it's name implies, is useful to you.
  - A. Hope each of you will return to your organization with better understanding of CIA role in national security matters.
  - B. Hope you can relate what you learn here to the problems you face and be thinking of ways the Agency can be of use to military establishments.
- III. Do want to cover several matters which, I am sure, you have already heard about, but I would like to underline them as of considerable importance.
  - A. The fact that we do not make policy.
    1. National Security Council
    2. 303 Committee
    3. Congressional Committees
    4. Ambassador is paramount officer in the field.  
(believe it would be helpful to describe manner in which proposals originate, are processed, and put forward for high level approvals.)
  - B. Damage done by public disclosures of extremely sensitive operations and the Soviet defamation campaign (the way in which all kinds of people, good and bad, wittingly or unwittingly serve this campaign.)
  - C. Outstanding professionalism of the Agency.
    1. Carefully trained and experienced intelligence officers in variety of fields ranging from political analysis through economic research, photo interpretation, space technology, espionage, counter intelligence, civic action and sabotage, to mention only a few.
    2. Depth of CIA experience reflected in length of service of the top 50 officials -- average of 15 years intelligence; 13.6 with CIA.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

- 2 -

STAT

3. More than [ ] of our senior professionals have been with CIA since it was established in September, 1947.

STAT

4. Station Chiefs [ ] average 16.4 years in intelligence; 13.5 in the Agency.
5. Educational background equally impressive.
6. Linguistic ability important. 74% of our officers have competence in at least one foreign language; a total skill covering 122 different foreign languages and dialects.

- IV. To maintain this professional proficiency requires comprehensive recruiting and training program.

A. JOT's

B. In-house and external training.

- V. Newsmen and others like to emphasize rivalries and conflicts within Government. I take a different tack and want to tell you of my and the Agency's appreciation for the cooperation of the military services with us.

[ ]

STAT

- B. We get help from the military in [ ] and interpreting intelligence.

STAT

- VI. This cooperation is a two-way street, and I assure you of our continued cooperation in matters of mutual interest.

- VII. Open for questions.

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

~~SECRET~~

STAT

X 5191

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Draft

SECRET

Suggested Notes for Mr. Helms, PROJECT [ ] Final Session, 10 Feb 65

STAT

STAT

[ ] - we hope it is well named. Its purpose is not public relations or self advertising, though some might think we need it. ( Possible: Aside on defamation campaign and the kinds of people who wittingly or unwittingly serve it.) Basic purpose is to enable you to do your job better. We believe firmly in the need-to-know principle. You all need to know

Why CIA exists

What it can do

Under what authorities it functions

303 Congress ✓  
Ambassadors

How it is organized

What its approaches are

What help you can offer it and what help it can give you

If this two days has given you a quick overview of these, it has been Useful. And if you need to know more, as many military officers do, this may furnish a foundation on which to build.

Newsmen and others like to emphasize rivalries and conflicts everywhere, and, among other places, within government. I would like to express a totally different sentiment than one of opposition or conflict. One of sincere appreciation for the cooperation that you in the Joint Staff and DIA give to CIA.

STAT

EXAMPLES: [ ]

But virtually every speaker these two days has touched on the services and the aid that the military give us: Cover, logistical help, cooperation in evaluating, getting and interpreting intelligence. You in Defense constitute a far larger segment of the Intelligence Community than does CIA and aid is a two-way street.

EXAMPLES: CIA [ ] backs them up on complicated cases. [ ]

STAT

STAT

But there is little point in my reiterating yet again the things you have heard several times yesterday and today. This is your last chance ( in this running of Project [ ] to get answers to questions. I'll answer candidly, even if only to say I can't answer.

STAT

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter

SUBJECT : Invitation to Address Military Officers Participating  
in the Two-Day Project [REDACTED]

STAT

1. On 9 and 10 February 1965, CIA will conduct another two-day briefing of selected senior U.S. military officers. This program is presented in response to a request from the DCI that senior officers of the Armed Services having intelligence or counterinsurgency responsibilities be indoctrinated in the organization and missions of CIA, as well as in the Agency's capabilities to support military operations.

2. You are invited to present the subject \_\_\_\_\_  
Welcome and Purpose of the Program  
which is scheduled from 0900 hours to 0925 hours on  
Tuesday, 9 February 1965 in the Headquarters Building, Room  
1A-07. In order to ensure proper continuity and coverage, and to avoid  
overlap of treatment, we have appended for your information:

a. A guidance sheet which sets forth the objectives and  
general tenor of the program.

b. Some suggestions concerning the scope of your presentation.

c. A schedule of the program which lists the specific  
subjects to be covered during two days of briefing.

3. If you would like additional information concerning the purpose, scope, and objectives of this program, I will be glad to discuss this matter with you. Should you require assistance in arranging for your presentation, please contact the Chief Instructor, [REDACTED]  
Headquarters Training, Operations School, Extension [REDACTED]

STAT  
STAT

STAT

[REDACTED]  
MATTHEW BAIRD  
Director of Training

Attachments:

1. Guidance
2. Suggestions for Presentation
3. Schedule

S E C R E T

Attachment A

Project   
Speaker Guidance Sheet

STAT

At the conclusion of the two-week Project  in 1963, the DCI requested that a shortened version be organized for presentation to senior officers of the DIA and other governmental agencies having responsibility for intelligence and counterinsurgency. A two-day version offered in February 1964 and October 1964 were enthusiastically received. As a result, the DDCI instructed OTR to organize a third two-day version. Invitations have been sent to the Chairman, JCS, asking him to nominate fifteen officers from the Joint Staff, and to the Director of DIA asking him to nominate thirty-five officers. We are emphasizing that those selected should be officers whose duties require an understanding of the Agency's organization and mission.

STAT

Objectives: The primary objective of this program from the Agency's viewpoint is to maintain and improve Agency-Department of Defense cooperation and coordination through a more effective understanding of CIA on the part of the military. We hope to inform these officers of our capability to support military efforts and, conversely, to let them know what support we need from them in order to carry out our missions.

Approach: Based on experience in Project  the audience has reacted most favorably to presentations which stressed the positive contributions which the Agency can make to the Intelligence Community and to the military. The use of actual cases to illustrate major points has increased the effectiveness of presentations.

STAT

Please bear in mind that for a number of these officers, this will be their first direct acquaintance with CIA. It might be well to avoid, or to spell out, internal Agency terminology with which they are not familiar. From past experience, we may expect frank and direct questions, a strong desire to understand, and an outgoing attitude that accepts CIA as a partner with whom they wish to turn in a good performance.

Administrative Considerations:

1. It is suggested that you leave at least 10 minutes for questions in each 50 minutes of time allotted to you.
2. Please confine your presentation to the time indicated on the schedule.
3. Students have been asked not to take written notes. However, if you wish to use handouts, these can be recovered from the students.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Attachment B

SUBJECT : Welcome and Purpose of the Program

TIME : 0900 - 0925

DATE : Tuesday, 9 February 1965

PLACE : Room 1A-07 Headquarters Building

METHOD OF PRESENTATION: Lecture with question period.

OBJECTIVE(S) : To welcome the Officers to CIA and to this presentation of an abridged version of the two week Project [ ] which is conducted annually. To explain to them that the purpose of this program is to maintain and improve Agency -- Department of Defense cooperation and coordination through a more effective understanding of CIA on the part of members of the military establishment.

STAT



S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

PROJECT USEFUL

Tuesday, 9 February 1965

0830 - 0900	Registration and Administration		
<u>0900 - 0925</u>	<u>Welcome and Purpose of the Program</u>	<i>Col. White did (Gen. P did closing remarks.)</i> <del>Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter</del> Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
0930 - 1030	The Background of CIA, Present Organization and Functions and National Security Relationships	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> CIA Briefing Officer	STAT
1040 - 1130	Organization and Functions of the Directorate for Science and Technology	Dr. Albert D. Wheelon Deputy Director for Science and Technology	
1140 - 1230	Organization and Functions of the Deputy Director for Support	Col. Lawrence K. White Deputy Director for Support	
1230 - 1330	Lunch		
1330 - 1420	Organization and Functions of the Directorate for Intelligence	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> Deputy Assistant Director for Research and Reports	STAT
1420 - 1520	Production of National Estimates	Sherman Kent Assistant Director National Estimates	
1530 - 1630	CIA Reference Facilities	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> Executive Assistant to the Assistant Director Office of Central Reference	STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Wednesday, 10 February 1965

0900 - 1000	The National Photographic Interpretation Center	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em;"></div> Deputy Director National Photographic Interpretation Center	STAT
1010 - 1100	Organization and Functions of the Clandestine Services	Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans	
1110 - 1145	War and Contingency Planning	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em;"></div> Acting Chief War Plans Staff	STAT
1155 - 1230	Covert Action Operations	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em;"></div> Chief, Covert Action Staff	STAT
1230 - 1330	Lunch		
1330 - 1420	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 280px; height: 3.5em;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 290px; height: 4.5em;"></div>	STAT
1430 - 1515	CIA Counterinsurgency Responsibilities	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em;"></div> DDP Special Group Officer	STAT
1525 - 1610	Functions and Responsibilities of an Area Operating Division	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 210px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em;"></div> Chief, WH Division	STAT
1615 -	Closing Remarks	John A. McGone <i>Gen. Carter</i> 2/ Director of Central Intelligence	

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

PROJECT

STAT

9 - 10 February 1965

Student Roster

Defense Intelligence Agency

NAME

RANK

COMPONENT

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

	Rear Adm.	USN	Chief of Staff, DIA
	Col.	USA	DIAPL
	Col.	USAF	DIAPL
	Capt.	USN	DIAPL
	Col.	USMC	DIAPL
	Col.	USA	Chief, Training Group, DIA
	Capt.	USN	Deputy Comptroller, DIA
	Col.	USAF	Chief, Assessments and Reporting Office
	Col.	USAF	Secretary, DIA
	Lt.Col.	USA	Deputy Chief, DIASP
	Civ.		Technical Director for Mapping, Charting & Geodesy, DIA
	Capt.	USN	Chief, Product Requirements Office, Assistant Director for Mapping, Charting and Geodesy, DIA
	Col.	USAF	Chief, Advanced Systems Office, Assistant Director for Mapping, Charting and Geodesy, DIA
	Maj.	USAF	Intelligence Staff Officer, Special Activities Office, DIA
	Capt.	USN	Chief, Western Division, Production Center, DIA

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

STAT

	Lt.Col.	USA	Executive Officer, Western Division, Production Center, DIA
	Cdr.	USN	Executive Officer, Latin American Division, Production Center, DIA
	Col.	USAF	DIARD
	Col.	USAF	Chief, Office of Counter-intelligence and Security, DIACI
	Lt.Col.	USA	Deputy Chief, JCS Group, Defense Intelligence Agency Secretariat
	Lt.Col.	USA	Chief, Library Branch, Production Center, DIA
	Capt.	USNR	Chief, Office of Photographic Interpretation, Production Center, DIA
	Lt.Col.	USA	Chief, Army Material Production Division, DIAAP-1R3
	Col.	USA	Transportation Division, Production Center, DIA
	Lt.Col.	USA	Western Division, Intelligence Support and Indications Center, DIA
	Lt.Col.	USAF	Deputy Chief, Editorial and Briefing Group, Intelligence Support and Indications Center, DIA
	Col.	USAF	Chief, NMCS Support Office (DIAAP-3) Assistant Director for Processing, DIA
	Capt.	USN	Deputy Commandant, DIS (DIAJT)
	Col.	USA	Chief, Eastern Division, DIA
Col.	USAF	Chief, USSR-Eastern Europe Division, Assistant Director for Processing DIA	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

STAT



Lt.Col.	USAF	Intelligence Photographic Library Division, Production Center, DIA
Col.	USAF	Chief, Intelligence Advisory Group Assistant Director for Processing DIA
Capt.	USN	Assistant Chief of Staff, Research & Development, DIA
Col.	USAF	Assistant Chief of Staff, Administration, DIA
Col.	USAF	Deputy Chief, Office of Collection Management, Directorate for Acquisition, DIA
Lt.Col.	USAF	Chief, Free World Branch, Requirements Processing Division, Collection Requirements Office, Directorate for Acquisition, DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Alternates (DIA)

STAT



Col.	USA	Chief, Sciences & Technologies Office
Lt.Col.	USA	Executive, Weapons & Systems Office, DIAST
Lt.Col.	USA	Chief, Chemical Branch
Lt.Col.	USAF	Chief, Command and Control Division, DIAST
Lt.Col.	USAF	Chief, Physics Branch
Lt. Col.	USAF	Chief, Bio-Medical Branch
Lt.Col.	USA	Chief, Technological Assessment Division
Lt.Col.	USAF	Intelligence Staff Officer, Training Group, DIA
Maj.	USAF	Special Engineer, Missiles and Space Office, Directorate of Scientific & Technical Intelligence, DIA
Capt.	USN	Chief, Management Analysis Division, DIA
Col.	USA	DIAPL
Col.	USAF	DIAPL
Cmdr	USN	DIAPL
Cmdr	USN	DIAPL
Col.	USAF	Chief, Disclosure Policy Group, DIACI
Lt.Col.	USAF	Chief, Personnel Security Division, DIACI
Civ.		Chief, CI Group, DIACI
Lt.Col.	USA	Western Division, Intelligence Support and Indications Center, DIA


Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Alternates (DIA cont'd)

STAT



Lt.Col.

USAF

Chief Middle American  
Branch, Latin American  
Division, DIAAP-2H

Lt.Col.

USA

Faculty Advisor for Advanced  
Intelligence Course, DIS,  
(DIAJT)

Lt.Cdr

USN

Faculty Advisor, Strategic  
Intelligence Course, DIA  
(DIAJT)

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

PROJECT USEFUL

9 - 10 February 1965

Student Roster

Joint Staff

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>PRESENT ASSIGNMENT</u>
	Lt.Col.	USAF	Member, Manpower Division, J-1
	Capt.	USN	Member, Pacific Division, J-3
	Lt.Col.	USA	Member, Atlantic/South Division, J-3
	Lt.Col.	USA	Member, European/Middle East Division, J-3
	Lt.Gen.	USA	Director for Logistics, Joint Staff
	Brig.Gen.	USAF	Deputy Director for Logistics Joint Staff
	Col.	USAF	JCS, J-5, Short Range Branch, Strategic Division
	Col.	USMC	JCS, J-5, Far East Division
	Col.	USAF	JCS, J-5, Far East Division
	Col.	USA	Chief, Plans and Policy Division
	Col.	USAF	Member, J-6
	Col.	USMC	Pacific Branch, Programs & Review Division, SACS, JCS
	Capt.	USN	Area II Branch, Programs & Review Division, SACS, JCS
	Capt.	USN	Special Operations Division, SACS, Joint Staff
	Civ.		Special Plans Division, SACS

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5

Alternates (Joint Staff)

STAT



Col.

USAF

Member, Atlantic/South  
Division, J-3

Capt.

USN

JCS, J-5, Far East Division

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001500020001-5